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In 1980, the Supreme Court gave a reassuring signal to the then-
nascent biotechnology industry about the availability of patent protec-
tion for the fruits of its research when it upheld the patentability of a 
genetically modified living organism in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.1 
Twenty-five years later, the Court seemed poised to reexamine the 
limits of patentable subject matter2 for advances in the life sciences 
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 1 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 327 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., 2006). 
 2 “Patentable subject matter” refers to the categories of inventions that 
might be patented, assuming the inventions meet the statutory standards for patent 
protection, as distinguished from those that are categorically excluded from the patent 
system because of the kinds of things they are.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).  If the invention is within patentable subject 
matter, the application still needs to be examined to be sure it meets the tests for nov-
elty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010); utility, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2010); nonobviousness, 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (2010); and adequate disclosure, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). But if the subject matter of the invention is cate-
gorically outside the patent system, the invention may not be patented even if it meets 
these other tests.  But cf. Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 
591 (2008) (arguing that judicial decisions that purport to rest on categorical exclu-
sions from patentable subject matter may be better explained as involving patents that 
fail other standards for patent protection). 
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when it granted certiorari in Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite.3  
But the Federal Circuit had not addressed the patentable subject mat-
ter issue in Laboratory Corporation, and the Court ultimately dis-
missed the certiorari petition as improvidently granted.4  Five years 
later, two pending cases in which the issue of patentable subject mat-
ter has been fully litigated in the lower courts5 provide opportunities 
for the Court to resolve some of the uncertainties exposed in Labora-
tory Corporation. 
For the quarter century preceding Laboratory Corporation, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the courts, and 
the patent bar, had—for the most part—taken it for granted that new 
advances in biotechnology were patentable subject matter,6 and moved 
on to the details of applying patent law standards such as novelty,7 
nonobviousness,8 utility,9 written description,10 and enablement11 to 
  
 3 Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), cert. granted sub nom. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 546 
U.S. 999 (2004).  
 4 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 546 U.S. 999 (2005), 
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006). In both the initial 
grant of certiorari and  the dissenting opinion of three Justices from the subsequent 
decision to dismiss certiorari, the Justices focused on the question of whether the 
diagnostic method patent at issue improperly claimed “a basic scientific relationship” 
that was categorically excluded from the patent system.  548 U.S. at 129 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the patent claim 
is invalid on the ground that it improperly seeks to ‘claim a monopoly over a basic 
scientific relationship, … namely, the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin 
deficiency.”). 
 5 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, 131 S.Ct. 3027 
(2011);  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 6 There were a few more issues to be worked out after Chakrabarty, such as 
the availability of utility patents for plants and animals. See Ex parte Allen, No. 86-
1790, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1987 WL 123816 (B.P.A.I, Apr. 3, 1987) (plants); 
J.E.M. Ag  Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (plants); In re Hibberd, 
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 1987 WL 71986 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985) (animals).  
 7 See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (holding that the patent claims at issue were invalid because there were inher-
ently anticipated by prior art). 
 8 See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding the patent to 
be invalid because “Deuel’s claims 5 and 7 [which were] directed to specific cDNA 
molecules[,] would have been obvious in light of the applied references.”); In re 
Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming “that appellants’ claims 
[were] unpatentably obvious”). 
 9 See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding patent 
claims to be invalid because the claimed invention lacked specific and substantial 
utility). 
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biotechnology inventions.  Older precedents that might have called 
patentable subject matter into question,12 although never clearly over-
ruled, had seemed destined to be lost in antiquity, as more recent deci-
sions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit consistently 
overruled prior judicial exclusions from patentable subject matter.13 
The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in patentable subject matter 
threatened to revive these aging precedents, disturbing the expecta-
tions of a patent-sensitive industry. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court finally reached the merits of a paten-
table subject matter dispute in Bilski v. Kappos,14 a case involving a 
business method15 rather than a diagnostic method.  Although the Jus-
  
 10 See Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (holding that the asserted claims were “invalid for failure to meet the statutory 
written description requirement.”). 
 11 See Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 188 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the claims at issue were “invalid as nonenabled”); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the appellant’s claims did not fail 35 U.S.C. § 
112 because a person skilled in the art could make and practice the claimed invention 
without undue experimentation). 
 12 See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 
(1948) (holding patent claims on mixed culture of naturally occurring bacteria to be 
invalid).  For a review and analysis of these precedents, see Eileen M. Kane, Patent 
Ineligibility:Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519 
(2006) (discussing the limits of patentability) and Linda J. Demain & Aaron Xavier 
Fellmeth, Reinventing the Public Domain: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualiza-
tion of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 303 (2002) (discussing the 
scope and purpose of patent law in biotechnology). 
 13 E.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that a computer-implemented accounting system for pooling 
assets from different mutual funds was patentable subject matter, rejecting arguments 
that this was a computer-implemented algorithm and a business method, and holding 
that patentable subject matter extended to anything that produces a “useful, concrete, 
and tangible result”); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Because § 101 includes processes as a category of patentable sub-
ject matter, the judicially-defined proscription against patenting of a ‘mathematical 
algorithm,’ to the extent such a proscription still exists, is narrowly limited to mathe-
matical algorithms in the abstract.”). 
 14 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 15 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub. nom. Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Specifically, Claim 1 of Bilski’s patent application 
claimed: “A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by 
a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: (a) initiating a series of 
transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity 
wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical 
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; (b) identi-
fying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said 
consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity pro-
vider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of mar-
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tices were unanimous in concluding that the claims were not drawn to 
patentable subject matter, they differed in their reasoning.  Four Jus-
tices would have embraced a categorical exclusion for “business 
methods”16 but five Justices rejected such an exclusion as inconsistent 
with the statutory text.17  All the Justices apparently agreed, however, 
that Bilski’s claim fell within the Court’s traditional exclusion of “ab-
stract ideas” from patentable subject matter.18  The Justices also 
agreed that the Federal Circuit had repeatedly erred in its interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court’s precedents on patentable subject matter:  
first, by setting the bar too low under the “useful, concrete and tangi-
ble” test from its 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group19; and second, by setting too rigid a rule in 
the “machine-or-transformation test” as set forth in its 2008 en banc 
decision in In re Bilski.20 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court left it to the 
  
ket participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer trans-
actions.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d  at 949 (citation omitted). 
 16 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (Stevens, J. joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & So-
tomayor, J.J., concurring) 
 17 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29.  Five Justices (Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, 
Thomas, and Scalia) rejected a “business methods” exclusion as inconsistent with 
1999 statutory amendments to provide an infringement defense, codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 273(b)(1), for prior users of patented business methods, id. at 3228-29, while four of 
these Justices (not including Scalia) would also reject such an exclusion as outmoded 
in the “Information Age,” id. at 3229. 
 18 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30 (“[T]he Court resolves this case narrowly on 
the basis of this Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that 
petitioners’ claims are not patentable processes because they are attempts to patent 
abstract ideas. Indeed, all members of the Court agree that the patent application at 
issue here falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract idea.”); id. at 3235 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (“Although I happen to agree that petitioners seek to patent an 
abstract idea, the Court does not show how this conclusion follows ‘clear[ly],’ [] from 
our case law.”) (citation omitted). 
 19 Compare State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the transformation of data constitutes “a practical 
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces 
a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result.’”), with Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231 (“[N]othing 
in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past. See, e.g., State Street, []; 
AT&T Corp., [].”) (citations omitted), and id. at 3232 n.1(Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t would be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a ‘useful, concrete and 
tangible result,’ State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. [], may 
be patented.”). 
 20 Compare In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (reaf-
firming “that the machine-or-transformation test, properly applied, is the governing 
test for determining patent eligibility of a process under § 101.”), with Bilski, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3227 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, & Alito, JJ., and, in perti-
nent part, by Scalia, J.) (“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determin-
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Federal Circuit to figure out the implications of Bilski v. Kappos for 
pending cases involving method claims from the biopharmaceutical 
industry.21   
One case that was then pending before the Federal Circuit, Asso-
ciation for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,22 
involved challenges to product and process claims related to DNA 
sequences used in diagnosing breast cancer susceptibility.  Before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the district court in 
Association for Molecular Pathology granted summary judgment of 
invalidity in favor of the challengers, invalidating claims to isolated 
DNA sequences encoding the breast cancer susceptibility genes 
BRCA1 and BRCA2, as well as claims to diagnostic methods involv-
ing the analysis of DNA samples for mutations in those genes.23  
Many biotechnology firms hold patents with similar claims, creating 
enormous interest in the outcome of this case on appeal.24 Indeed, the 
biotechnology industry filed amicus briefs in Bilski v. Kappos alerting 
the Court to the implications the decision might have for existing bio-
technology patents.25 
  
ing whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-
eligible ‘process.’”) ; id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsberg, Breyer, & So-
tomayor, J.J., concurring) (“The Court correctly holds that the machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for what constitutes a patentable process; rather, 
it is a critical clue.”). 
 21 On the same day that it handed down its decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded two such cases that the 
Federal Circuit had previously decided under its “machine-or-transformation” test. 
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (claims 
patentable subject matter under machine-or-transformation test), cert. granted, judg-
ment vacated, and case remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), on remand, 628 F.3d 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. Appx. 
866 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (claims not patentable subject matter under machine-or-
transformation test), rehearing denied, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24202 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010). 
 22 No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 5, 
2010) (amending Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 23 Id. 
 24 See, e.g., Donald Zuhn, AMP v. USPTO – Briefing Update III, PATENT 
DOCS  (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/02/amp-v-uspto-briefing-
update.html (containing links to most of the thirty amicus briefs that were filed in this 
case). 
 25 See Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, Briefs: November 
2009 – 2010 Term, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/publiced_preview_briefs_no
v09.html#bilski (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (containing links to sixty-eight amicus 
briefs that were filed in the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos). 
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Perhaps the Supreme Court concluded that the safest course was 
to decide Bilski in a way that sheds as little light as possible on pend-
ing biotechnology cases. The Bilski tea leaves have something to offer 
both challengers and defenders of biotechnology patents. Challengers 
may find support in the Court’s renewed endorsement of historical 
nonstatutory exclusions of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas” from patentable subject matter and in the overarching 
directive to the Federal Circuit to look to Supreme Court precedents in 
elaborating patentable subject matter doctrine.26 Defenders of bio-
technology patents may find support in the Court’s disapproval of the 
Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the “machine-or-transformation” 
test as the sole test of patent-eligibility for processes,27 in its emphasis 
on the expansive statutory text as the primary determinant of paten-
table subject matter,28 and in an explicit expression of concern from 
four Justices in Bilski about the impact of the machine-or-
transformation test on the patentability of “advanced diagnostic medi-
cine techniques.”29 
The majority’s dual focus on the expansive language of the statu-
tory text and on the stare decisis effects of its own more restrictive 
  
 26 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (noting that these exceptions are not required by 
statute, but “they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new 
and useful.’”). 
 27 The Court in Bilski did not reject the machine-or-transformation test en-
tirely, but instead approved it as a “useful and important clue” that is not the sole test 
for determining patentable subject matter for processes.  Id. at 3226-27. Both the 
USPTO and the Federal Circuit subsequently seized upon this “clue” in reaffirming 
the centrality of the machine-or-transformation test in defining patentable subject 
matter.  See Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bilski …  rejected the machine-or-transformation test only as a 
definitive test … Thus, the Court did not disavow the machine-or-transformation test.  
And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and important clue, an investigative 
tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that the present claims pass 
muster under § 101.”); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Memorandum from Robert 
W. Bahr, Acting Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent 
Examining Corp, Regarding Supreme Court Decision in Bilski v. Kappos (June 28, 
2010), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf (“Examiners 
should continue to examine patent applications with §101 using the existing guidance 
concerning the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for determining whether the 
claimed invention is a process under §101.”).   
 28 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (The Supreme Court has “more than once cau-
tioned that courts ‘should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions 
which the legislature has not expressed.’”). 
 29 Id. at 3227 (“As numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-
transformation test would create uncertainty as to the patentability of software [and] 
advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.”) (Justice Scalia did not join this portion of 
the opinion). 
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prior decisions sends mixed signals about the Court’s own interpretive 
inclinations. It provides limited guidance for future decisions because 
it does not rest on any general principles that might inform analysis of 
future claims. Indeed, continuing in the tradition of the precedents it 
reaffirms, the Court offers no account of what function subject matter 
limitations serve in the patent system beyond reciting that patentable 
subject matter is “only a threshold test.”30 In the absence of an account 
of the function of this threshold test, one can only wonder why the 
Supreme Court has reached out to revive previously moribund limita-
tions on patentable subject matter, and what work those limitations 
should be doing that distinguishes the threshold test from the further 
sorting that goes on in the course of examining claims that get beyond 
the threshold for patentability. Some commentators have suggested 
that most if not all of the Court’s patentable subject matter precedents 
could be better understood in terms of other requirements for patent 
protection such as novelty, nonobviousness, or limitations on claim 
scope.31 In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court not only failed to offer clear 
guidance as to the boundaries of patentable subject matter, but also 
missed an opportunity to explain what patentable subject matter is 
about. 
In this article, I consider alternative accounts of the work that pat-
entable subject matter doctrine might do for the patent system in the 
hope of clarifying the application of that doctrine to diagnostic 
method claims. I begin with a review of recent doctrinal developments 
to show that current patentable subject matter doctrine suffers from a 
lack of clarity not only as to what the applicable rules are, but also as 
to what those rules are supposed to accomplish. I then consider what it 
might mean for patentable subject matter to function, as it is some-
times described, as a “threshold test” of patentability that precedes a 
more in-depth examination for compliance with other statutory stan-
dards. Although such a threshold test might offer administrative bene-
fits, current patentable subject matter doctrine cannot and does not 
function as a threshold test. I next consider what functions patentable 
subject matter doctrine might perform beyond the threshold that are 
distinct from the functions performed by other doctrinal standards for 
  
 30 Id. at 3225 (“The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.”). 
 31 E.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 622-23 (2009) (highlighting the Court’s ability to re-
strict the patent system by using the obviousness doctrine); Kristen Osenga, Ants, 
Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1115-18 (2007) 
(arguing that the courts and the Patent Office “may be using § 101 rejections as prox-
ies for other difficult questions of patentability and policy.”); Risch, supra note 2. 
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patent protection such as novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate dis-
closure. I conclude that patentable subject matter doctrine performs 
functions that are neither entirely distinct from these other doctrines 
nor redundant to them. Patentable subject matter doctrine leaves some 
aspects of new discoveries in the public domain and limits the scope 
of allowable claims in ways that might depart from limitations im-
posed by prior art and disclosure requirements. Although perhaps 
suggestive of prior moorings in public policy, existing doctrine pro-
vides minimal guidance as to how to use patentable subject matter 
doctrine to further the goals of the patent system. 
 
I. Revival of Subject Matter Exclusions 
 
Although §101 of the Patent Act32 defines patentable subject mat-
ter in broad terms to include “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter,” a long line of judicial deci-
sions recites additional exclusions from patent protection.33  In Bilski 
v. Kappos, the Supreme Court characterized these non-statutory ex-
clusions narrowly as “three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad pat-
ent-eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.’”34 Prior Supreme Court cases have sometimes recited 
the exclusions in different and more expansive terms, free of the nar-
rowing qualifier “specific.” For example, the Court has stated that “a 
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable 
invention,”35 that “patents cannot issue for the discovery of the 
phenomena of nature,”36 that “[p]henomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are 
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technologi-
cal work,”37 and that “an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is 
like a law of nature.”38 In addition to these broadly articulated ex-
  
 32 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
 33 The Supreme Court’s recent interest in patentable subject matter has in-
spired a rich literature reviewing these exclusions. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The 
Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject-Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353 (2010); 
Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract 
Idea,” 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011); John F. Duffy, supra note 31; Allen K. 
Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility – A Disease and a Cure, 84 So. CAL. L. REV. 
387 (2011). 
 34 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 (1980)). 
 35 Mackay Radio & Tel. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
 36 Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 37 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 38 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). 
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clusions, past judicial decisions and administrative practice seemed to 
recognize specific field exclusions from patentable subject matter for 
plants and animals,39 medical and surgical techniques,40 business 
methods,41 and printed matter.42   
None of these limitations is apparent from the statutory language, 
and some that once looked like settled, black-letter law have subse-
quently been questioned if not entirely disavowed by the courts in 
more recent decisions.43  Most of the action has been in the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, although the U.S. Supreme Court has 
affirmed the patentability of living subject matter in decisions that 
broadly assert that patentable subject matter extends to “anything un-
der the sun that is made by man.”44 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
invoked this language in decisions expanding patentable subject mat-
ter to include computer-implemented inventions45 and business meth-
ods.46 This expansive approach reached a peak in State Street Bank & 
Trust v. Signature Financial Group and AT&T v. Excel Communica-
tions.  In these cases the Federal Circuit rejected the strictures of ear-
lier decisions that had limited patentable subject matter to inventions 
that were “tangible” in the sense of physical or material47 in favor of a 
  
 39 See Duffy, supra note 31 at 625-32 (exploring the “[u]npatentability of 
plants and animals.”). 
 40 Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882-83 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1862) (use of ether for anesthesia cannot be patented); Ex parte Brinkerhoff, No. 182, 
24 Dec. Comm’r Pat. (1883) (Case No. 182), reprinted in 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 797, 
798 (1945) (methods of treatment of diseases not patentable). 
 41 Lowe’s Drive-In Theatres v. Park-In Theaters, 174 F.2d 547, 551-52 (1st 
Cir. 1949) (invalidating a patent for a terraced drive-in movie theater); Hotel Sec. 
Checking v. Lorraine, Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (invalidating a patent for a 
bookkeeping register to prevent fraud in hotels and restaurants). 
 42 In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (bank check and stub 
system); In re Reeves, 62 F.2d 199, 200 (C.C.P.A. 1932) (chart to aid in appraising 
buildings); In re Russell, 48 F. 2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (system for indexing names in 
a directory) . 
 43 See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-78 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (disavowing business methods exclusion); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 
1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (questioning “legal and logical footing” of printed matter 
exclusion); Ex parte Scherer 103 U.S.P.Q. 107, 110 (B.P.A.I. 1954) (expressly over-
ruling Brinkerhoff, supra note 40). 
 44 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Congressional 
committee reports accompanying 1952 Patent Act); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001) (holding that plants are patentable subject matter). 
 45 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia Research 
Tech. v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 46 AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 47 Compare Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059-60 (“These claimed steps of ‘con-
verting’, ‘applying’, ‘determining’, and ‘comparing’ are physical process steps that 
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broader standard that embraced anything that produces a “useful, con-
crete, and tangible result.”48  
The Supreme Court has never disavowed its own exclusions from 
patentable subject matter for laws of nature, products of nature, ab-
stract ideas, and mental processes. But after upholding the patentabil-
ity of a living organism in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and of a com-
puter-implemented method for calculating the cure time for molded 
rubber articles the next year in Diamond v. Diehr,49 the Court seemed 
to retire from policing the subject matter boundaries of the patent sys-
tem following the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1982.50  
After a long period of acquiescence51 in the expansive approach of 
the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court surprisingly reached out to 
address the topic of patentable subject in Laboratory Corporation v. 
Metabolite. The patent at issue in that case claimed a method of diag-
nosing vitamin deficiency by observing homocysteine levels and no-
ticing whether they are elevated.52 The lower courts did not address 
whether the patent covered patentable subject matter,53 but the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari solely on the question of whether the 
claims covered patentable subject matter or whether they impermissi-
bly claimed a basic scientific relationship.54 This set off alarm bells in 
the biotechnology patent community because the claim at issue re-
  
transform one physical, electrical signal into another.”), with AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358 
(“physical transformation” is not “an invariable requirement, but merely one example 
of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application.”). 
 48 State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373; AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357. 
 49 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 50 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
 51 The one Supreme Court case to address patentable subject matter during 
this period approved the eligibility of plants for utility patent protection.  J.E.M. Ag 
Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 52 The sole claim at issue recited: “A method for detecting a deficiency of 
cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a 
body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated 
level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or fo-
late.” Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 999 (2004), cert. dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
 53 Id. 
 54 More specifically, the Court granted certiorari “limited to question three 
as presented in the petition.”  546 U.S. 999.  Question three asked “[w]hether a 
method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed, and nonenabling step directing 
a party simply to ‘correlat[e]’ test results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic 
scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor necessarily 
infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test 
result.”  http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/04-00607qp.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
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sembled many other patent claims on diagnostic methods that involve 
observing and analyzing a biological marker to make a diagnosis or to 
determine an appropriate course of treatment.55 A majority of the 
Court, perhaps figuring it was not appropriate for the Supreme Court 
to address such an important question of patent law without the bene-
fit of the Federal Circuit’s analysis, dismissed certiorari as improvi-
dently granted.56 However, three Justices thought the issue presented 
was “not unusually difficult” and were therefore ready to invalidate 
the patent claims on subject matter grounds without waiting for the 
issue to percolate in the lower courts.57   
The claim, according to the dissent, improperly sought to patent a 
basic scientific relationship between homocysteine levels and vitamin 
deficiencies, and was therefore unpatentable for the same reasons that 
preclude patenting e=mc2, the law of gravity, or the heat of the sun.58 
Clearly distinguishing patentable subject matter from other require-
ments for patent protection, the dissent justified the exclusion as a 
way to preserve free access to the “basic tools” of scientific research:  
 
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that 
“laws of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or 
that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such 
matters may be costly and time-consuming; monetary incen-
tives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that re-
search may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, 
the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent 
protection can impede rather than “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of patent 
and copyright protection.59 
 
  
 55 Kevin Collins calls such claims “determine-and-infer claims.”  See Kevin 
Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of Intangibil-
ity, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/collins.intangibility.pdf; 
Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 S.M.U. L. Rev. 317, 323-42 
(2007); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Irrelevance of Intangibility in Medical Diagnos-
tic Patents U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Kevin Emerson Collins, Rethinking 
Patent Eligibility: The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy (working paper on file 
with the author). 
 56 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125 
(2006). 
 57 Id. at 126 (Breyer, J. dissenting).  Although Justice Breyer is still on the 
Court, the two Justices who joined his dissenting opinion (Souter & Stevens, JJ.) have 
since retired. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 126-27. 
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The dissenting Justices feared that patents on fundamental scien-
tific principles could 
 
discourage research by impeding the free exchange of informa-
tion, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of po-
tentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and 
time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by re-
quiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the 
costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibi-
tively so.60  
 
The dissent recognized the difficulty of defining categories like 
phenomena of nature, mental processes and abstract intellectual con-
cepts, but nonetheless concluded that the claim before them was not 
close to the boundary. They saw the correlation between homocys-
teine levels and vitamin deficiency as a “natural phenomenon,”61 and 
it did not save the claim from invalidity that it was necessary to proc-
ess a tissue sample in order to measure homocysteine levels.62 
Notably, it was a diagnostic method patent, rather than a business 
method patent, that brought the attention of the Supreme Court back 
to the issue of patent eligibility in Laboratory Corporation .  Al-
though some diagnostic method patents have provoked controversy,63 
business method patents have been far more controversial among le-
gal scholars and economists.64 But business methods are not basic 
  
 60 Id. at 127. 
 61 Id. at 134-35. 
 62 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 63 See, e.g., Mildred C. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the 
Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3 
(2003); Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test:  The Pitfalls of Patents 
Are Illustrated by the Case of Hemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577 (2002); Sirpa Soini 
et al., Patenting and Licensing in Genetic Testing: Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, 
16 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 10 (2008). 
 64 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577-1589 (2003); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business 
Method Patents Bad for Business? 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000); 
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property 
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 
(1999); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:  The 
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 181, 227-36 
(2009); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of 
Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 92 (1999); Bronwyn H. Hall, Business 
Method Patents, Innovation and Policy, University of California, Berkeley Competi-
tion Policy Center Working Paper No. CPC03-39 (2003), available at 
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tools of scientific research, and patents on business methods do not 
make a good poster child for the rhetorical moves and policy argu-
ment advanced by Justice Breyer for excluding patents on building 
blocks to leave room for further innovation. 
Although Laboratory Corporation created no binding authority,65 
it sounded a warning to the Federal Circuit that its expansive approach 
to patentable subject matter might be vulnerable to reversal in an ap-
propriate case. After a series of unanimous reversals of Federal Cir-
cuit decisions by the Supreme Court,66 the Federal Circuit seemed 
eager for an opportunity to address the issue of patentable subject 
matter ahead of the Supreme Court; it went so far as to ask for sup-
plemental briefing on patentable subject matter in an appeal from a 
rejection on entirely different grounds.67 Meanwhile, the PTO and the 
lower courts resumed rejecting and invalidating claims for lack of 
patentable subject matter,68 renewing the flow of appeals and setting 
the stage for Federal Circuit and Supreme Court review.69  
  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=463160 (last visited Oct. 25, 
2011).  
 65 See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Mayo, as did the district court, points to the opinion of three Jus-
tices dissenting from the dismissal of the grant of certiorari in Lab. Corp…. Again, 
with respect, we decline to discuss a dissent; it is not controlling law, and it involved 
different claims from the ones at issue here.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 
(2008); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427–28 (2007); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741–42 (2002); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado 
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997). 
 67 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We do not reach 
the ground relied on by the Board below--that the claims were unpatentable as obvi-
ous … --because we conclude that many of the claims are ‘barred at the threshold by 
§ 101.’”) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)). 
 68 See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25062; 86 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1705 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336 ( 
Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), on 
remand, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, Patent 
Application Publ’n No. 2004/0122764, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, 2006 WL 5738364 
(B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/fd022257.pdf (last visited Nov. 
22, 2011) 
 69 See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d, 130 
S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3543 (2010), on remand, 
628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. 
App’x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3541 
(2010), on remand, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011); Re-
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The first of these cases to command both en banc attention of the 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court review on the merits was Bilski v. 
Kappos. Bilski’s patent application claimed a method of hedging 
against risks of price fluctuations in commodities trading.70 The PTO 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner’s 
rejection for lack of patentable subject matter.71The Federal Circuit 
had by this time affirmed rejections for lack of patentable subject mat-
ter in two other cases, using inconsistent analytical approaches.72 To 
clarify the law, the court ordered en banc review in In re Bilski.73 
Congress created the Federal Circuit in order to bring greater uni-
formity and predictability to the application of patent law.74 Mindful 
of that mandate, the Federal Circuit often prefers bright-line rules that 
point towards clear outcomes in future cases75 over broad, open-ended 
standards that require the exercise of judgment and on which reason-
able minds can differ. But Supreme Court precedents on patent law, 
including its decisions about patentable subject matter, more typically 
state broad, open-ended principles.76 The Supreme Court had repeat-
edly faulted and reversed the Federal Circuit for applying unduly rigid 
rules that departed from the flexibility of its own precedents.77 This 
dynamic is apparent in Bilski. 
  
search Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Nuijten, 
500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); . 
 70 See Bilski, supra note 15. 
 71 Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, Patent Application Publ’n No. 
2004/0122764, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, 2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 
2006). 
 72 Compare In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(method and system for mandatory arbitration involving legal documents not paten-
table because neither the Framers nor Congress intended patentable subject matter to 
include “business systems … that depend entirely on the use of mental processes”), 
with In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory watermarked 
“signal” in digital audio file not patentable under textual analysis of categories set 
forth language of § 101). The Federal Circuit subsequently vacated and withdrew its 
opinion in In re Comiskey and revised its decision. 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 73 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 74 See generally Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003). 
 75 See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
771 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach 
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1103-15 (2003). 
 76 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
 77 See, e.g., KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by 
rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court’s en-
gagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and 
flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test 
here.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 
(2002) (“It is true that the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of patents less 
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The Federal Circuit en banc majority attempted to unify the Su-
preme Court’s previously announced subject matter exclusions and 
“to clarify the standards applicable in determining whether a claimed 
method constitutes a statutory ‘process’ under § 101.”78  They began 
by blending the Supreme Court’s categorical exclusions into one, 
characterizing the issue as “whether Applicants are seeking to claim a 
fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or a mental proc-
ess.”79 After a lengthy review of the Supreme Court cases, they con-
cluded that: 
 
The Supreme Court… has enunciated a definitive test to de-
termine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to 
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental prin-
ciple rather than to pre-empt the principle itself. A claimed 
process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to 
a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a par-
ticular article into a different state or thing.80 
 
Because Bilski’s risk hedging method did not “involve the trans-
formation of any physical object or substance, or an electronic signal 
representative of any physical object or substance,” and because Bil-
ski admitted failure to meet the alternative machine-implementation 
prong of the test, the court concluded that his claims did not qualify as 
patentable subject matter under the machine-or-transformation test 
and affirmed the rejection.81  
  
certain. It may be difficult to determine what is, or is not, an equivalent to a particular 
element of an invention. … These concerns with the doctrine of equivalents, however, 
are not new. Each time the Court has considered the doctrine, it has acknowledged 
this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation, and 
it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.”).  A notable 
counterexample is Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 67 n.11 (1998), in which 
the Supreme Court replaced the Federal Circuit’s open-ended standard for determin-
ing whether an invention is “substantially complete” based upon a “totality of the 
circumstances,” as announced in Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co., 
103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) with a (perhaps) clearer standard of “ready for 
patenting.” Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 567. 
 78 The majority opinion commanded the votes of nine of the twelve members 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). One judge wrote a separate concurrence, and three filed dissents. 545 F.3d at 
966 (Dyk, J., concurring); 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting); 545 F.3d at 998 
(Mayer, J., dissenting); 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 79 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952.  This conflation is quite explicit.  The major-
ity posits: “As used in this opinion, ‘fundamental principles’ means ‘laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ Id. at 952 n.5. 
 80 Id. at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
 81 Id. at 963-64. 
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The machine-or-transformation test thus supplied a single bright-
line rule for excluding all “fundamental principles,” uniting the treat-
ment of a claimed method of hedging risks in commodities trading 
with the treatment of e=mc2, the law of gravity, and the heat of the 
sun. This comprehensive rule threatened to exclude not only patents 
on risk-hedging methods, but also patents on methods of analyzing 
diagnostic markers.82  Indeed, shortly after the Federal Circuit en banc 
embraced the machine-or-transformation test in Bilski, a Federal Cir-
cuit panel relied on Bilski in summarily affirming a trial court decision 
invalidating a patent claiming “a method of determining whether an 
immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic 
immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative 
to a control group of mammals.”83 The trial court had held the patent 
invalid on the ground that it claimed a natural phenomenon. In a very 
brief opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed, but on the different ground 
that “Dr. Classen’s claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus’ nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a different 
state or thing.’”84 
In Prometheus v. Mayo Collaborative Services, the Federal Cir-
cuit came out the other way, reversing a district court decision invali-
dating a patent on a “a method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for 
treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.”85 Al-
though the District Court had held the claims excluded from paten-
table subject matter because they recited “mental steps” and “natural 
phenomena,”86 the Federal Circuit did not separately address these 
  
 82 See Kevin Emerson Collins, The (Ir)relevance of Intangibility in Medical 
Diagnostic Patents, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with the author). 
 83 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 98106, at *13 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x. 866 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated in part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010), on 
remand, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug 31, 2011).  See infra notes 
181-205  and accompanying text. 
 84 Classen Immunotherapies, 304 Fed. Appx. at 866.  The Federal Circuit did 
not consider claim language in its brief unpublished opinion, but at least some of the 
claims included as a step in the method “immunizing mammals in the treatment group 
of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens,” Classen Immuno-
therapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126, at *8, a step that triggers an (arguably trans-
formative) immune response in the immunized mammals.  
 85 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (reversing 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008)).  The Fed-
eral Circuit again reached the same decision through very similar reasoning on re-
mand for reconsideration in light of Bilski v. Kappos.  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (2011).  See infra notes  109-125 
and accompanying text. 
 86 Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1341. 
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exclusions but instead used the machine-or-transformation test.87 
Rather than reciting a purely diagnostic method, the Prometheus 
claims embedded a diagnostic step within a claimed method of opti-
mizing treatment.88 Most of the claims included the steps of (1) ad-
ministering a drug to a patient and then (2) determining the level of 
metabolites in the patient’s blood to determine whether the dose was 
too high or too low, but some claims did not recite the “administer-
ing” step.89 The Federal Circuit concluded that each of these two steps 
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test because (1) giving a drug 
to a patient causes transformation in the patient’s body and (2) deter-
mining metabolite levels involves chemical assays that bring about 
physical and chemical changes in the patient’s tissue samples.90 Ac-
cording to the Federal Circuit, these transformative steps were not 
merely incidental data-gathering, but were integral to the treatment 
regime.91 
In both Classen and Prometheus, the Federal Circuit took its ma-
chine-or-transformation test to be entirely dispositive of the issue of 
patentable subject matter for the claimed methods, and did not con-
sider whether claims to the analysis of biological markers might call 
for a different analysis than claims to business methods. The machine-
or-transformation rule did not find favor with the biopharmaceutical 
industry, and numerous amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in 
Bilski v. Kappos alerted the Court to the risks that rule posed for pat-
ents on diagnostic methods.92  
  
 87 Id. at 1346 (holding that “transformation … of the human body following 
administration of a drug” satisfied the machine-or-transformation test for a diagnostic 
method that involved administering a drug and measuring drug metabolites in a tissue 
sample). 
 88 For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 claim 1, which the Federal Circuit 
took to be representative of the independent claims at issue, reads: “A method of 
optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject 
having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level 
of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disor-
der, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood 
cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered 
to said subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 
8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subse-
quently administered to said subject.” Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1340. 
 89 Id. at 1347. 
 90 Id. at 1346-47. 
 91 Id. at 1348. 
 92 See, e.g., Brief for Novartis Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_PetitionerAmCuNovartisCorp.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief 
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II. The Limited Guidance of Bilski v. Kappos 
 
The Supreme Court had no occasion to speak directly to the 
proper treatment of diagnostic method claims in its opinion in Bilski v. 
Kappos.93  There was little in the majority opinion that would provide 
even indirect guidance as to the patentability of any claims other than 
those at issue. The Justices all agreed that Bilski’s claims were not 
patentable subject matter because they “are attempts to patent abstract 
ideas,”94 but they did not explain what that means. Although the Court 
insisted that the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test is 
not the exclusive test for patentability of processes, they affirmed that 
test as “a useful and important clue” without indicating when that clue 
might prove inadequate or misleading.95  Nor, for that matter, did they 
explain whether the machine-or-transformation test is “a useful and 
important clue” in evaluating the patentability of inventions that are 
not processes,96 or of inventions that are not “abstract ideas” but that 
  
for Caris Diagnostics as Amicus Curiae  Supporting  Petitioners, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_PetitionerAmCuCarisDiagnostics.authcheckdam.pdf; 
Brief for The Univ. of S. Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Petitioners, 30 S. 
Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_PetitionerAmCuUnivofSFlorida.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief 
of Adamas Pharm. and Tethys Bioscience as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,  
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)  (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_964_RespondentAmCu2PharmCos.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief 
for Biotechnology Indus. Org. et. al as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_NeutralAmCu4MedTechOrgs.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief 
for Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_NeutralAmCuPhRMA.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 93 See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text. 
 94 See supra note 18. 
 95 As noted supra at n.29 and accompanying text, four Justices expressed 
concern that “the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the 
patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions 
based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital sig-
nals.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.  The opinion went on to “emphasize that the Court 
today is not commenting on the patentability of any particular invention, let alone 
holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age 
should or should not receive patent protection.” Id. at 3228. 
 96 The machine-or-transformation test, which the Federal Circuit in Bilski 
attributed to the Supreme Court, has its origins in cases involving the patentability of 
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might fall within a different exclusion, such as products of nature, 
phenomena of nature, or mental processes. 
Nonetheless, the decision in Bilski v. Kappos alleviated some of 
the anxiety triggered in the biopharmaceutical patent community by 
the dissenting opinion in Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite97 and 
by the en banc decision of the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski.98  Sig-
nificantly, the Justices were unanimous in concluding that the ma-
chine-or-transformation test was not the sole test of patent-eligibility 
for processes, leaving room to argue that process patents involving the 
analysis of biomarkers might be patentable even if they do not pass 
the machine-or-transformation test.99 To the extent that the Justices 
limited the use of that test, they seemed worried that it would exclude 
too much rather than too little.100 The rhetorical tone of the majority 
opinion in Bilski v. Kappos was more cautious than that of the dis-
senters in Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite, emphasizing fidelity to 
statutory language and stare decisis and explicitly declining to adopt 
“categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen im-
pacts.”101 For an industry seeking to preserve the patent-eligibility of 
  
processes.  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“Transformation and 
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a 
process claim that does not include particular machines.”); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 
U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (a “process” is “an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the 
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing”);. 
 97 See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. 
 98 See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text. 
 99 See William J. Simmons, Bilski v. Kappos: The U.S. Supreme Court 
Broadens Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 801, 805 
(2010) (“the Court narrowly avoided a catastrophe for the biotech and pharmaceutical 
industry”): Roy Zwahlen, BIO Commends Supreme Court for Expansive View of 
Patentability in Bilski Decision, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG. (June 28, 2010) 
http://patentlybiotech.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/bio-commends-supreme-court-for-
expansive-view-of-patentability-in-bilski-decision/ (“This ruling specifically states 
that the ‘machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for patent eligibility’ and 
recognized that the lower court’s ruling could have created uncertainty in fields such 
as advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.”).   
 100 This concern is most clearly articulated in portions of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion that Justice Scalia did not join and that therefore failed to command a major-
ity of the Court. See, e.g, Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3227 (“The machine-or-transformation 
test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to those in the 
Industrial Age — for example, inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible 
form. But there are reasons to doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion for 
determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age. As numerous 
amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to 
the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inven-
tions based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital 
signals.”). 
 101 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. 
        JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET      [Vol. 3:1] 
20 
 
its advances, a narrow opinion limited to the facts of Bilski v. Kappos 
was grounds for cautious optimism. 
The post-Bilski decisions of the Federal Circuit reveal a diver-
gence of views within that court as to the impact of Bilski on the re-
vival of patentable subject matter exclusions set off by Laboratory 
Corporation v. Metabolite. Two opinions authored by Judge Lourie102 
make the most of the Supreme Court’s qualified endorsement in Bilski 
of the machine-or-transformation test as an “important clue” for dis-
tinguishing patent-eligible processes from abstract ideas.  These opin-
ions apply that test to diagnostic method claims, notwithstanding con-
cerns expressed by a plurality of four Justices about its appropriate-
ness for “advanced diagnostic medical techniques.” Under this ap-
proach the key to patent eligibility for diagnostic methods is a chemi-
cally transformative step recited in the claim language. Judge Lourie 
also looks to chemistry to define the scope of the exclusion from pat-
entable subject matter for products of nature, holding that a claim to 
isolated DNA is patentable subject matter if isolation of the claimed 
material from its natural environment requires the breaking of “cova-
lent bonds.”103  By reverting to the bright-line approach of the Federal 
Circuit’s own en banc decision in Bilski, these opinions arguably cur-
tail patentable subject matter further than the Supreme Court required 
when it rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the “sole test” 
of patent eligibility.104 
Chief Judge Rader takes a different approach, reading the Su-
preme Court in Bilski as disapproving of non-statutory limitations on 
patentable subject matter, such as the machine-or-transformation test, 
while directing the Federal Circuit to develop criteria for identifying 
unpatentable “abstract ideas” that are not inconsistent with the statu-
tory text.105  Eschewing bright-line rules, Judge Rader emphasizes that 
patentable subject matter is only a “threshold test” that need not ex-
clude every invention that is unworthy of a patent.106  Instead, before 
  
 102 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 
4764 (2011); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 103 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1352. 
 104 Cf. CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(claimed method for verifying the validity of an internet transaction invalid both 
under machine-or-transformation test and because process could be performed by 
human mentally or using pen and paper). 
 105 Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Clas-
sen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, Nos. 2006-1636, 2006-1649, slip op. at 13 
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011) (additional views of Rader, C.J., joined by Newman, J.). 
 106 Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868. 
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excluding a claim from patentable subject matter for abstractness, 
“this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as 
to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter 
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the pat-
entability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”107 Under this minimal-
ist approach to patentable subject matter exclusions, “inventions with 
specific applications or improvements to technologies in the market-
place are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory 
language and framework of the Patent Act.”108 This approach, while 
responsive to the Supreme Court’s admonition to honor the expansive 
statutory language of § 101, seems to ignore the Court’s explicit rejec-
tion of the Federal Circuit’s own previous “useful, concrete and tangi-
ble” test for patentable subject matter from its 1998 decision in State 
Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.109 
 
A. The Enduring Machine-or-Transformation Test 
 
The first opportunity to apply the teachings of Bilski v. Kappos to 
biopharmaceutical methods fell to Judge Lourie. On reconsideration 
of Prometheus Labs. on remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the continuing centrality of the machine-or-
transformation test as the primary determinant of patentability.110 
Judge Lourie began the opinion for a unanimous panel111 by charac-
terizing the patentable subject matter issue as whether the claims112 
would “entirely preempt” the use of a natural phenomenon, which 
would make them invalid under Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. 
Flook, or whether they were drawn “only to a particular application of 
that phenomenon,” as permitted by Diamond v. Diehr.113 He noted 
that the Federal Circuit’s first decision in the same case had concluded 
“that Prometheus’ claims are drawn not to a law of nature, but to a 
particular application of naturally occurring correlations, and accord-
  
 107 Id. at 868. 
 108 Id. at 869.  See also Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(method of distributing content over the internet in exchange for viewing advertise-
ments was patentable subject matter as a practical application of idea that advertising 
can serve as currency). 
 109 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 110 Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 
4764 (2011). 
 111 Id. at 1349. The other panel members were Chief Judge Rader and Judge 
Bryson. 
 112 See supra note 88. 
 113 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1354. 
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ingly do not preempt all uses of the recited correlations between me-
tabolite levels and drug efficacy or toxicity.”114 Noting that the Su-
preme Court opinion did not “disavow” the machine-or-
transformation test, but rather characterized it as “a useful and impor-
tant clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed 
inventions are processes under § 101,” Judge Lourie concluded that 
“as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and important clue, an 
investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., 
that the present claims pass muster under § 101. They do not encom-
pass laws of nature or preempt natural correlations.”115 In other words, 
the panel found the same “useful and important clue” that helped de-
termine that the claims in Bilski covered “abstract ideas” also useful in 
discerning whether a claim is impermissibly drawn to laws of nature 
or preempts natural correlations; otherwise, the panel’s conclusion 
would be a non sequitur.   
But the equivalence of “abstract ideas” and “phenomena of na-
ture” is by no means self-evident. “Abstract idea” is an ambiguous 
term that the Supreme Court has regrettably left undefined.116 One 
understanding of the term “abstract” is the opposite of “concrete” or 
“tangible.”117 The machine-or-transformation test may be a good 
proxy for this particular meaning of “abstract,” but phenomena of 
nature are not necessarily abstract in this sense. Although abstract 
ideas and mental processes may be recognized by their intangible 
character, many natural phenomena (including the judicial litany of 
e=mc2, gravity, and the heat of the sun) bring about the transformation 
of matter from one state to another. Perhaps, then, we need another 
  
 114 Id. at 1355.  Although the Federal Circuit does not pinpoint where in its 
prior decision it analyzes the preemption issue, the prior decision pervasively con-
flates the question of preemption of a natural phenomenon with the machine-or-
transformation test.  See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1349 (“The claims cover 
a particular application of natural processes to treat various diseases, but transforma-
tive steps utilizing natural processes are not unpatentable subject matter. Moreover, 
the claims do not preempt natural processes; they utilize them in a series of specific 
steps. … Regardless, because the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test, 
they do not preempt a fundamental principle. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (characteriz-
ing the machine-or-transformation test as ‘a definitive test to determine whether a 
process is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application of a 
fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle itself’). The inventive 
nature of the claimed methods stems not from preemption of all use of these natural 
processes, but from the application of a natural phenomenon in a series of transforma-
tive steps comprising particular methods of treatment.”) 
 115 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1353-55. 
 116 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpaten-
table Abstract Idea”, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 53-60 (2011) (analyzing the 
possible meaning of “abstract idea”). 
 117 Id. at 54. 
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clue to separate out patentable applications of natural phenomena 
from the unpatentable phenomena themselves. 
The excluded category that seems most relevant to the Prome-
theus claims is “mental processes.”118  The Prometheus claims are an 
example of what Professor Kevin Collins calls “determine and infer” 
claims.119  These claims involve determining a measurable medical 
fact or biomarker for an individual120 and then making an inference 
from the value of that biomarker about the individual’s health or diag-
nosis.  The inference step may be what makes the invention useful, 
and perhaps what distinguishes it from the prior art.   
 
Consider the following claim at issue in Prometheus: 
 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of 
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:  
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject 
having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and  
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject hav-
ing said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,  
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol 
per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the 
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject 
and  
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol 
per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the 
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said sub-
ject.121  
 
The Prometheus opinion recognizes that the exclusion for mental 
processes might be a problem for those elements of the claim that 
recite diagnostic inferences, but concludes that the claim as a whole 
nonetheless recites patentable subject matter because it satisfies the 
machine-or transformation test:   
 
We agree with the district court that the final “wherein” 
clauses are mental steps and thus not patent-eligible per se. 
However, although they alone are not patent-eligible, the 
  
 118 Cf. id. at 46 (arguing that Federal Circuit has improperly conflated the 
excluded categories of “abstract idea” and “mental process”). 
 119 See  supra note 55. 
 120 E.g., Prometheus Labs., supra note 88. 
 121 Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1340 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 
claim 1 (filed Apr. 8, 1999)). 
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claims are not simply to the mental steps. A subsequent mental 
step does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of 
prior steps.  Thus, when viewed in the proper context, the final 
step of providing a warning based on the results of the prior 
steps does not detract from the patentability of Prometheus’s 
claimed methods as a whole.  …  No claim in the Prometheus 
patents claims only mental steps.122 
 
This analysis stands in marked contrast to that of the dissenting 
justices in Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite 
Laboratories.123  The Laboratory Corporation claim also included 
transformative process steps to detect homocysteine levels, and the 
patent holder pointed to those steps in arguing that the claim was 
drawn to an “application of a law of nature” rather than to the natural 
correlation itself, but the dissenting Justices were unpersuaded: 
 
Claim 13’s process instructs the user to (1) obtain test results 
and (2) think about them.  Why should it matter if the test re-
sults themselves were obtained through an unpatented proce-
dure that involved the transformation of blood?  Claim 13 is 
indifferent to that fact, for it tells the user to use any test at all. 
… [A]side from the unpatented test, they embody only the cor-
relation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency that the 
researchers uncovered.  In my view, that correlation is an un-
patentable ‘natural phenomenon,’ and I can find nothing in 
claim 13 that adds anything more of significance.124 
 
Judge Lourie dismissed this analysis in a footnote to the Prome-
theus opinion, stating that “with respect, we decline to discuss a dis-
sent; it is not controlling law, and it involved different claims from the 
ones at issue here.”125 The panel might instead have distinguished 
Laboratory Corporation in ways that would have been more illumi-
nating in future cases.126 That they did not even make the effort sug-
  
 122 Prometheus Labs.,628 F.3d at 1358. 
 123 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) 
(per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 124 Id. at 136-38 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 125 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1356 n.2. 
 126 They might, for example, have considered whether it mattered that the 
diagnostic analysis set forth in the Prometheus claims was embedded in a treatment 
intervention, while the diagnostic analysis set forth in the Laboratory Corporation 
claim would cover observation and analysis of data from a patient who was not re-
ceiving any treatment. 
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gests, perhaps, that they no longer think the views of the dissenters 
could command a majority of the Supreme Court today.   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories127 on the following question, as 
framed by Mayo in its petition: 
 
Whether 35 U.S.C. § 101 is satisfied by a patent claim that 
covers observed correlations between blood test results and pa-
tient health, so that the claim effectively preempts all uses of 
the naturally occurring correlations, simply because well-
known methods used to administer prescription drugs and test 
blood may involve “transformations” of body chemistry.128 
 
This framing packs into a single sentence at least three distinct is-
sues, including (1) the relevance (and meaning) of whether observed 
correlations are “naturally occurring,” (2) the relevance (and meaning) 
of whether the claim “effectively preempts all uses” of the correla-
tions, and (3) the relevance of whether the steps in the process relied 
upon to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test—administering a 
drug and taking a blood test—are “well-known.”  A fourth issue is the 
relevance of the machine-or-transformation test to the patent eligibil-
ity of the claims at issue. 
The first of these issues goes to the meaning of the exclusion for 
“phenomena of nature” in the context of medical interventions. The 
petitioner’s assertion that the correlation between observed levels of a 
drug metabolite and the need to adjust drug dosage is “naturally oc-
curring,” perhaps intended to revive the concerns of the Laboratory 
Corporation dissenters, points to the clearest ground for distinguish-
ing the two cases. Even accepting that the correlation between homo-
cysteine levels and vitamin deficiency was a “natural phenomenon” 
that removed the Laboratory Corporation claim from patentable sub-
ject matter,129 the correlation recited in the Prometheus claim between 
drug metabolite levels and the need to adjust a patient’s drug dosage 
poses a more difficult question. Vitamin deficiencies arguably arise in 
nature, but the Prometheus correlation is embedded in a therapeutic 
regimen that requires human intervention. If observations of the bio-
  
 127 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (June 20, 2011). 
 128 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.  Prometheus 
Labs.,  (No. 10-1150), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/10-01150qp.pdf. 
 129 This assertion might not withstand close analysis.  Quite apart from the 
(entirely conventional) human interventions necessary to measure cobalamin levels, a 
diagnosis of “vitamin deficiency” is itself a human construct, requiring human judg-
ment as to what is normal and what is pathological.   
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logical consequences of therapeutic interventions, and related infer-
ences about the need to adjust those interventions, were to be ex-
cluded from patent protection, it would seem that the reason must lie 
outside the exclusion for “phenomena of nature.”  
The second issue recalls prior Supreme Court cases invalidating 
claims that “wholly preempt” use of an unpatentable claim element, 
such as a mathematical algorithm or a natural phenomenon, and that 
are thus deemed to claim the unpatentable element itself.130  Again, 
this issue might look different in the context of a purely diagnostic 
claim (such as that at issue in Laboratory Corporation) than it does in 
claims that embed a diagnostic step in a specific regimen for adjusting 
ongoing treatment (such as those at issue in Prometheus). A claim that 
is tied to a particular treatment regimen might not “wholly preempt” a 
natural correlation between biomarker and inferred medical condition 
if the claim would not be infringed by substituting different biomarker 
values as indicators of a need to adjust the drug dosage, or by pre-
scribing a different treatment for the same condition.  Every claim 
“wholly preempts” the subject matter that it covers; the issue is how 
broadly one may claim a diagnostic inference.  One might further 
question whether itis fair to characterize a correlation between an ob-
served biomarker and the inference of a need to adjust treatment as a 
natural phenomenon, or whether that correlation is more accurately 
understood as an artifact of human medical intervention.   
The third issue concerns the fact that the novel contribution of the 
inventor—the mental step of inferring a need to adjust the drug dos-
age from observed values for a biomarker—is not patentable subject 
matter taken alone, as the Federal Circuit conceded.131  Some prior 
Supreme Court decisions have invalidated claims in which the value-
added of the inventor beyond unpatentable elements (such as a 
mathematical algorithm or a product of nature) is unworthy of patent 
protection in its own right; however, it has not always been clear 
whether the problem with these claims is lack of patentable subject 
matter or something else, such as obviousness or lack of novelty.132 
The Laboratory Corporation dissenters dismissed as irrelevant to 
patent eligibility the fact that the diagnostic method claim before them 
included an assay step that required chemical transformation of a tis-
sue sample through an unspecified (and unclaimed) process.133 Intui-
tively it may seem odd to rest the determination of patentable subject 
matter on the transformative character of incidental claim elements 
  
 130 See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 131 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 245-252 and accompanying text. 
 133 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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that do not otherwise contribute to the patentability of the invention.  
But arguably the Supreme Court did just that in Diamond v. Diehr,134 
when it affirmed the patent eligibility of a computer-implemented 
“method of operating a rubber-molding press with the aid of a digital 
computer,”135 over a vigorous dissent pointing out that the only paten-
table difference between the invention and the prior art was the use of 
an unpatentable “algorithm” to calculate the rubber cure time.136  In 
Bilski v. Kappos the Supreme Court noted that patentable subject mat-
ter is only a “threshold test,” and that inventions that pass that test 
must still meet other statutory requirements for protection, including 
novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and adequate description.137 Perhaps, 
then, the Court will affirm the Federal Circuit’s approach of relying 
on physically transformative steps that are not themselves new or pat-
entable to establish the patent eligibility of a method that relies upon 
non-transformative mental steps to meet the other requirements for 
patentability, thus leaving it to other doctrinal tools to reject or invali-
date the claims for lack of novelty or for obviousness if appropriate.138  
But if the machine-or-transformation test has more than talismanic 
significance as a clue to patent eligibility, perhaps it should not be so 
easily evaded by reciting in the claims conventional steps that do 
nothing to distinguish the invention from the prior art.139   
Rather than elaborating upon the machine-or-transformation test, 
the Court might instead seize the opportunity to clarify what it meant 
in Bilski v. Kappos when it disapproved of the Federal Circuit’s reli-
ance on the machine-or-transformation test as the “sole test” of patent 
eligibility.140 Although explicitly acknowledging this directive from 
the Supreme Court, in practice some Federal Circuit panels and the 
PTO have used the machine-or-transformation test to the exclusion of 
other analytical approaches to identify patentable subject matter.141 If 
  
 134 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 135 Id. at 179 n. 5, 192-93. 
 136 Id. at 193, 207-208 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 137 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
 138 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2010). 
 139 Of course, new combinations of old elements may be patentable if the 
combination itself is not suggested in the prior art.   
 140 See supra notes 20 and 27. 
 141 The PTO directed examiners to continue using the machine-or-
transformation test the day after the Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos.  See 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Associ-
ate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corp, Regard-
ing Supreme Court Decision in Bilski v. Kappos (June 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf (“Examiners 
should continue to examine patent applications for compliance with section 101 using 
the existing guidance concerning the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for 
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this is not what the Supreme Court intended, it may need to be clearer 
about when use of the machine-or-transformation test is inappropriate. 
Readers of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Bilski v. Kappos might 
suspect that what he (and the three Justices joining Part II.B.2 of his 
opinion)142 meant in stating that the machine-or-transformation test is 
not the sole test for patentability is that while inventions that pass that 
test are patent-eligible subject matter, inventions that fail that test 
might get to take a different test: 
 
The machine-or-transformation test may well provide a suffi-
cient basis for evaluating processes similar to those in the In-
dustrial Age -- for example, inventions grounded in a physical 
or other tangible form. But there are reasons to doubt whether 
the test should be the sole criterion for determining the pat-
entability of inventions in the Information Age. As numerous 
amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would 
create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced 
diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear 
programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digi-
tal signals. … 
 
In the course of applying the machine-or-transformation test to 
emerging technologies, courts may pose questions of such in-
tricacy and refinement that they risk obscuring the larger ob-
ject of securing patents for valuable inventions without trans-
gressing the public domain. … As a result, in deciding whether 
previously unforeseen inventions qualify as patentable “proc-
ess[es],” it may not make sense to require courts to confine 
themselves to asking the questions posed by the machine-or-
transformation test. §101’s terms suggest that new technolo-
gies may call for new inquiries.143 
 
The Federal Circuit has sometimes persisted in applying the ma-
chine-or-transformation test to “advanced diagnostic medicine tech-
  
determining whether the claimed invention is a process under §101.  If a claimed 
process meets the machine-or-transformation test, the method is likely patent-eligible 
under §101 unless there is a clear indication that the method is directed to an abstract 
idea.  If a claimed method does not meet the machine-or-transformation test, the 
examiner should reject the claim under §101 unless there is a clear indication that the 
method is not directed to an abstract idea.”). 
 142 Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3223 (The excerpt from Justice Kennedy’s opinion set 
forth in text was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito, but not by Justice 
Scalia, who joined other portions of the opinion.). 
 143 Id. at 3227-28 (citations omitted). 
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niques” even when it excludes such techniques from patent eligibility. 
Writing for a different Federal Circuit panel, Judge Lourie used the 
machine-or-transformation test to invalidate diagnostic method claims 
in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office.144 In that case, the Federal Circuit reviewed a district court 
ruling145 issued after the Federal Circuit’s embrace of the machine-or-
transformation test in In re Bilski and its first opinion in Prometheus 
v. Mayo, but before the Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos.  
The district court held invalid multiple product and process claims 
related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast cancer susceptibility genes. 
A sharply divided Federal Circuit panel146 reversed the district court 
in part to uphold the validity of “composition of matter” claims to 
“isolated DNA” molecules.147 However, the panel was unanimous in 
its analysis of the process claims. Each member of the panel joined 
Judge Lourie’s opinion affirming the invalidity of claims to methods 
of comparing or analyzing human DNA samples to detect alterations 
or mutations indicating increased susceptibility to breast cancer148 and 
reversing the district court to uphold the patent eligibility of a claim to 
a method of screening potential cancer therapeutics.149   
  
 144 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(The panel included Judge Lourie, Judge Moore, and Judge Bryson.). 
 145 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2010). 
 146 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 1329. Each member of the 3-
judge panel wrote separately, with two judges concluding that the claims to isolated 
DNA were patentable subject matter, id. at 1333-34 (opinion of Lourie, J.); id. at 
1358 (opinion of Moore, J., concurring in part);   id. at 1373 (Bryson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (concluding that claims to BRCA genes and gene frag-
ments were not directed to patentable subject matter). 
 147 Id. at 1334 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 1 (filed June 7, 
1995)) (“An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having 
the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 2.”).  
 148 E.g., id. at 1334 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 claim 1 (filed June 7, 
1995)  (“A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said altera-
tion selected from a group consisting of the alterations set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18, 
or 19 in a human which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 
RNA from a human sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from 
mRNA from said human sample with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a 
deletion of 4 nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-4187 of SEQ ID 
N0:1.”). 
 149 See id. at 1335 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 20 (filed June 7, 
1995)  (“A method for screening potential cancer therapeutics which comprises: 
growing a transformed eukaryotic host cell containing an altered BRCA1 gene caus-
ing cancer in the presence of a compound suspected of being a cancer therapeutic, 
growing said transformed eukaryotic host cell in the absence of said compound, de-
termining the rate of growth of said host cell in the presence of said compound and 
the rate of growth of said host cell in the absence of said compound and comparing 
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Judge Lourie’s analysis of the method claims is a straightforward 
application of the machine-or-transformation test, which the district 
court had relied upon in holding these claims invalid.150 The panel 
held that the method claims to “comparing” or “analyzing” gene se-
quences “fall outside the scope of § 101 because they claim only ab-
stract mental processes.”151  The opinion rejected the argument that 
the method is patent eligible because it can only be performed after 
the prior steps of extracting DNA from a human sample and sequenc-
ing the BRCA DNA molecules in the sample, noting that the claim 
language does not include these prior steps.152 This allowed the court 
to distinguish the Prometheus claims, which included the “transforma-
tive” steps of “administering” a drug to a patient and “determining” 
the levels of a drug metabolite in a patient.153 The opinion concluded 
that claims to methods of “comparing” and “analyzing” DNA se-
quences “fail to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, and are 
instead directed to the abstract mental process of comparing two nu-
cleotide sequences.  The claims thus fail to claim a patent-eligible 
process under § 101.”154  
The panel also relied on the machine-or-transformation test as an 
“important clue” to reverse the district court’s holding of invalidity for 
a claim to a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics.155 The 
court noted that the claim recites the “inherently transformative” steps 
of (1) “growing” host cells transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene 
in the presence or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, and (2) 
“determining” the growth rate of the host cells with or without the 
potential therapeutic:  
 
The claim thus includes more than the abstract mental step of 
looking at two numbers and “comparing” two host cells’ 
growth rates. The claim includes the steps of “growing” trans-
formed cells in the presence or absence of a potential cancer 
therapeutic, an inherently transformative step involving the 
manipulation of the cells and their growth medium. The claim 
  
the growth rate of said host cells, wherein a slower rate of growth of said host cell in 
the presence of said compound is indicative of a cancer therapeutic.”). 
 150 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 at *147-61. Indeed, the district court had the Federal Cir-
cuit’s first opinion in Prometheus before it and took pains to distinguish the two 
cases. Id. at *149-60. 
 151 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1355. 
 152 Id. at 1356. 
 153 Id. at 1357.  See also supra notes 85-91. 
 154 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1357. 
 155 Id. at 1357-58; see supra note 149 for the language of the claim. 
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also includes the step of “determining” the cells’ growth rates, 
a step that also necessarily involves physical manipulation of 
the cells.156 
 
After this analysis of the method claims under the machine-or-
transformation test, the opinion recites a litany of phrases from the 
patentable subject matter caselaw in support of its conclusion, includ-
ing that “the claim is not so ‘manifestly abstract’ as to claim only a 
scientific principle” and that “the claims do not preempt all uses of the 
natural correlations; they utilize them in a series of specific steps.”157 
But it is the machine-or-transformation test that appears to do the real 
work for the panel of distinguishing between the unpatentable claims 
to methods of “comparing” and “analyzing” and the patent eligible 
claims to methods of screening potential cancer therapeutics. 
With the benefit of the Federal Circuit’s opinion it would not be 
difficult to redraft future diagnostic method claims to recite patentable 
subject matter.  Using Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Collabora-
tive Services and American Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO as guides, patent applicants could satisfy the machine-or-
transformation steps by reciting as claim limitations transformative 
steps that necessarily precede any comparison of the value of a bio-
marker for a particular patient with a reference value. Consider, for 
example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999, held invalid under the 
machine-or-transformation rule: 
 
A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1 
gene, said alteration selected from a group consisting of the al-
terations set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18, or 19 in a human 
which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or 
BRCA1 RNA from a human sample or analyzing a sequence 
of BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA from said human sample 
with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a deletion 
of 4 nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-4187 of 
SEQ ID N0:1.158 
 
The downfall of this claim is that it begins with the mental step of 
“analyzing” a sequence without reciting the prior steps necessary to 
obtain and process a tissue sample in order to have a sequence to ana-
lyze. Compare claim 46 of U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, which the Fed-
  
 156 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d  at 1357. 
 157 Id. at 1358. 
 158 U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 claim 1 (filed June 7, 1995). 
        JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET      [Vol. 3:1] 
32 
 
eral Circuit approved as claiming patentable subject matter in Prome-
theus:  
 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy and reducing 
toxicity associated with treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
…. 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine or 6-
methylmercaptopurine in a subject administered a drug 
selected from the group consisting  of 6-mercaptopurine, 
 azathiop[u]rine, 6-thioguanine, and 6-methyl-
mercaptoriboside, said subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol 
per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the 
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject 
and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 
pmol per 8x10 8 red blood cells or a level of 6-
methylmercaptopurine greater than about 7000 pmol per 8x10 
8 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of 
said drug subsequently administered to said subject.159 
 
The Federal Circuit saw the analytical inferences in the “wherein” 
clauses of this claim as unpatentable mental steps, but the “determin-
ing” step set forth prior to those clauses was a transformative step that 
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test and saved the claim from 
invalidity. If that is all it takes, it would seem that Claim 1 of the ‘623 
patent could likewise be saved by inserting explicit claim steps of 
“obtaining a DNA sample from a patient” and “determining the 
BRCA1 or BRCA2 DNA sequence in the patient’s DNA” immedi-
ately before the word “analyzing.”160 
It is by no means clear that this is what the Supreme Court had in 
mind in approving the machine-or-transformation test as a “useful 
clue” but not the “sole test” of the patent eligibility of processes. Prior 
decisions have sometimes found similar claims-drafting maneuvers 
inadequate to avoid an exclusion from patentable subject matter, in-
sisting, for example, that the transformative claim element should be 
  
 159 U.S Patent No. 6,355,623 claim 1 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); Prometheus Labs, 
628 F.3d at 1349 (“[W]e again hold that Prometheus’s asserted method claims are 
drawn to statutory subject matter, and we again reverse the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment of invalidity under § 101.”). 
 160 Prometheus Labs, 628 F.3d at 1350. 
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disregarded when it amounts to “insignificant post-solution activ-
ity”161 or mere “data-gathering steps.”162 Even if the Court is generally 
disposed to recognize patent eligibility for “advanced diagnostic 
medical techniques,” it might not be satisfied with identifying a 
claims-drafting maneuver that works for future patent applicants, but 
leaves current holders of claims drafted in “determine and infer” for-
mat with disappointed expectations. 
Concern for the disappointed expectations of patent holders may 
have played a decisive role in the divided panel’s analysis of the pat-
entability of composition of matter claims to isolated DNA, an issue 
on which the Supreme Court opinion in Bilski v. Kappos offers little 
guidance.163 The United States as amicus curiae did not defend the 
PTO’s longstanding practice of allowing patents to issue on isolated 
DNA molecules, but instead urged the Federal Circuit to affirm the 
District Court’s holding that these claims were unpatentable products 
of nature.164  Nonetheless, Judge Lourie and Judge Moore both noted 
  
 161 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-192. 
 162 E.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The sole 
physical process step in Grams’ claim 1 is step [a], i.e., performing clinical tests on 
individuals to obtain data. … The presence of a physical step in the claim to derive 
data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory.”). 
 163 The Court in Bilski was not concerned with the patentability of products of 
nature and did not include “products of nature” in its list of time-honored exclusions 
from patent eligibility.  On the other hand, the Court cited with approval its own prior 
decisions in cases recognizing such an exclusion. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (“Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was 
not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether 
living or not, and human-made inventions.”); Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 
U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (Mixed culture of naturally occurring strains of bacteria selected 
for their non-inhibition of each other’s function was not patentable subject matter 
because “[i]t is no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature …. 
The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of 
bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. …. Their use in combination 
does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature 
originally provided, and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”); J. 
E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001) (citing with approval 
the above-quoted passage from Chakrabarty);  Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex 
Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1931) (Orange rind treated with borax to protect against de-
cay was not sufficiently changed from its natural state to constitute a patentable 
“manufacture” because “[a]ddition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not pro-
duce from the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive 
form, quality, or property.”). 
 164 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party 
in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 
2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853320, available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/genepatents-USamicusbrief.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011).  
        JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET      [Vol. 3:1] 
34 
 
that such a departure from longstanding practice should come from 
Congress rather than from the courts.165   
The main disagreement among the panel members concerned 
whether segments of DNA that have been isolated from chromosomes 
but are otherwise unaltered are unpatentable products of nature. For 
Judge Lourie, human intervention to cleave the covalent bonds that 
unite the DNA molecule to other genetic material in its natural state is 
enough to make the isolated DNA molecules “markedly different 
[with a] distinctive chemical identity and nature [] from molecules 
that exist in nature,” making the claims patent eligible.166 Judge 
Moore, however, read the precedents as requiring that the isolated 
molecule must do more than “serve the ends nature originally pro-
vided,” and that human modifications must give the product “mark-
edly different characteristics with the potential for significant utility” 
in order to avoid the exclusion for products of nature.167  Judge Moore 
concluded that short DNA molecules isolated from chromosomes 
meet this standard because they could be used as primers and probes 
for diagnostic testing, but that longer DNA sequences that are unsuit-
able for these uses present a more difficult question. 168  Nonetheless, 
given the longstanding practice of the PTO to allow patents on iso-
lated DNA, Judge Moore concluded that the longer sequences were 
also patentable subject matter, noting concern for the impact of a con-
trary decision on the settled expectations of the biotechnology indus-
try.169  Judge Bryson dissented from the holding of patent eligibility 
for isolated DNA, reasoning that, notwithstanding the breaking of 
chemical bonds, the isolated genes are not “materially different” from 
the same genes as they occur in nature. 170 
The variety of claims at issue, the sharp disagreements among the 
panel members, and the care taken in each opinion to be faithful to 
precedent provide a strong foundation for Supreme Court review.  
 
B. The Minimalist “Coarse Filter” Approach 
 
Other post-Bilski patentable subject matter opinions from the Fed-
eral Circuit suggest a different approach, assigning a minimal role to 
subject matter exclusions reminiscent of the pre-Laboratory Corpora-
  
 165 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1354-55 (Lourie, J.); id. at 
1367-68, 1370-73 (Moore, J., concurring in part) 
 166 Id. at 1351 (Lourie, J.). 
 167 Id. at 1359-60 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted). 
 168 Id. at 1365-67. 
 169 Id. at 1366-70. 
 170 Id. at 1373, 1375 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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tion era in the Federal Circuit. The first of these opinions was 
authored by Chief Judge Rader in Research Corporation Technolo-
gies v. Microsoft,171 shortly before the second Federal Circuit decision 
in Prometheus v. Mayo. Judge Rader, who also joined Judge Lourie’s 
opinion as a member of the Prometheus panel, set an entirely different 
tone in writing for the Research Corporation panel.172 That case in-
volved an invention in the longstanding patent eligibility battleground 
of information technology – specifically, a new method for allowing 
computers and printers to more efficiently render approximations of 
an image using digital halftoning technology.173   
Judge Rader began by noting that patentable subject matter is only 
a “threshold test,” and that the statute directs primary attention to the 
other conditions and requirements for patentability.174  He mentioned 
the “machine or transformation” test only to recognize that the Su-
preme Court had faulted that test as “nonstatutory.”175  Turning to the 
question of whether the claimed processes were excluded from paten-
table subject as “abstract,” Judge Rader did not seek clues to the 
meaning of that term, but saw its ambiguity as empowering the Fed-
eral Circuit to minimize the exclusion: 
 
The Supreme Court did not presume to provide a rigid formula 
or definition for abstractness. … Instead, the Supreme Court 
invited this court to develop “other limiting criteria that further 
the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its 
text.” …With that guidance, this court also will not presume to 
define “abstract” beyond the recognition that this disqualifying 
characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override 
the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the 
statutory context that directs primary attention on the pat-
entability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.176 
 
Explaining why “this court perceives nothing abstract in the sub-
ject matter of the processes claimed,” Judge Rader noted the “func-
tional and palpable applications” of the process, and observed that 
“inventions with specific applications or improvements to technolo-
gies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they over-
  
 171 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
 172 Id. at 862 (The panel consisted of Chief Judge Rader and Judges Newman 
and Plager.). 
 173 Id. at 862-63. 
 174 Id. at 868. 
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. at 868. 
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ride the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”177 The 
opinion notes in passing that some of the claims require a “high con-
trast film,” “a film printer,” “a memory,” and “printer and display 
devices” and that these features “also confirm this court’s holding that 
the invention is not abstract.”178 But Judge Rader does not dwell on 
these physical elements or use the words “machine or transformation” 
to explain their relevance.179  The discussion of patentable subject 
matter concludes by noting that claims that “pass the coarse eligibility 
filter” might still fail the tests of claim definiteness and written de-
scription and that § 112 of the Patent Act180 might be a more appropri-
ate way to invalidate claims that are not clear and concrete rather than 
a subject matter exclusion.181  
This minimalist approach to the role of § 101 appears again in the 
analysis of biopharmaceutical method claims in the recent decision of 
the Federal Circuit in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC on 
remand from the Supreme Court.182  Prior to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Bilski v. Kappos, the Federal Circuit had affirmed summary 
judgment of invalidity for the patent claims under the machine-or-
transformation test in a brief opinion.183   The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Bil-
ski.184 The three opinions from a divided panel on remand reveal sharp 
divisions both on the role of patentable subject matter doctrine and on 
its application to the claims at issue.  None of the opinions embraces 
the machine-or-transformation test. 
Judge Newman, joined by Chief Judge Rader, found the claims of 
two of the three patents at issue patent-eligible under § 101, although 
questioning whether the same claims would survive challenges to 
their validity based on other statutory requirements, but affirmed the 
judgment of invalidity as to the claims of a third patent.185  Regretta-
bly, the invalidity analysis for the third patent rests on a questionable 
reading of the claim language, as Judge Moore explains in an em-
  
 177 Id. at 868-69. 
 178 Id. at 869. 
 179 Id. at 868-69. 
 180 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010) (outlining the extent to which claims must be 
specified). 
 181 Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 869. 
 182 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, Nos. 2006-1634, 2006-1649, 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011). See also supra notes 83-84 
and accompanying text (prior history). 
 183 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App’x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 
2008).  
 184 Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC,  130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010). 
 185 Classen Immunotherapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 at *44. 
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phatic dissent.186  Judge Rader wrote separately in an opinion joined 
by Judge Newman to inveigh against “a rising number of challenges 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101” and to implore the court to “decline to accept 
invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility.”187    Although ex-
pressing profound skepticism toward “judge-made” restrictions on 
patent eligibility, Judge Rader attributes the problem to “litigants”188 
rather than to the Supreme Court and does not enter into an analysis of 
how the Court’s precedents apply to the claims at issue in Classen. 
As Judge Newman explains, the patents arise from Dr. Classen’s 
discovery that administering the first dose of a vaccine prior to 42 
days of age substantially decreases the likelihood of chronic immune-
mediated disorders.189 The two patents that Judge Newman deems 
patent-eligible (the ‘139 patent and the ‘739 patent) claim a method of 
immunizing subjects by first “screening” information about the occur-
rence of chronic disease in patients who have been immunized accord-
ing to different immunization schedules, “comparing” the results, 
“identifying” the lower risk immunization schedule, and then “immu-
nizing” patients according to the schedule that shows a lower risk of 
chronic immune-mediated disorders.190 The third patent (the ‘283 pat-
ent), according to Judge Newman, omits the final step of immunizing 
patients and  “claims the idea of comparing known immunization re-
sults that are, according to the patent, found in the scientific literature, 
but does not require using this information for immunization pur-
poses.”191 In other words, the ‘139 and ‘739 patents claim methods 
  
 186 Id. at *51, *53-54, *55 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“I am perplexed by 
the majority’s suggestion that this claim ‘is directed to the single step of re-
viewing the effects of known immunization schedules,’ Maj. Op. at 20, as the 
claim clearly requires immunizing mammals and then comparing the results 
to the known group …. The ‘283 patent claim clearly and unequivocally 
requires the physical act of immunization and it is unfair of the majority to 
analyze  the claim for § 101 purposes as though it did not have that step.”). 
 187 Id. at *45 (additional views of Rader, C.J., joined by Newman, J.). 
 188 Id. at *45 (“The language of § 101 is very broad.  Nevertheless, litigants 
continue to urge this court to impose limitations not present in the statute.”) 
 189 Id. at *5 (majority opinion). 
 190 Id. at *5-6. 
 191 Id. at *25.  This interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the language of 
the claim, which explicitly calls for immunizing patients in a trial in order to deter-
mine the lowest risk immunization schedule: “A method of determining whether an 
immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-
mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of 
mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mam-
mals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immuni-
zation schedule, and comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of 
said chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in 
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that include first comparing the results of studies to figure out the 
lower risk schedule and then immunizing patients according to that 
schedule, while the ‘283 patent does not require actually immunizing 
patients and may be infringed merely by reading study results. 
Given these claim interpretations, the results Judge Newman 
reaches would be easy to justify under the machine-or-transformation 
rule in reliance on Prometheus v. Mayo and Association for Molecular 
Pathology, but she instead looks primarily to Judge Rader’s opinion in 
Research Corporation for guidance. She invokes Research Corpora-
tion repeatedly for the principles that § 101 is a “coarse eligibility 
filter,” that other substantive conditions and requirements are avail-
able to weed out patents that are too vague or indefinite or conceptual, 
and that inventions with applications in the marketplace are unlikely 
to be so abstract that they are excluded from the broad reach of the 
statute.192   
Under this approach, Judge Newman concludes that the ‘139 and 
‘739 patents pass the threshold of patentability because they are “di-
rected to a specific, tangible application, as in Research Corpora-
tion.”193 That application is “lowering the risk of chronic immune-
mediated disorder.”194  Although she notes that the claims include “the 
physical step of immunization on the determined schedule,” she does 
not purport to apply the machine-or-transformation test. Instead she 
invokes “the guidance of Bilski v. Kappos that ‘[r]ather than adopting 
categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen im-
pacts,’ exclusions from patent-eligibility should be applied ‘nar-
rowly,’” and notes that the claims “raise cogent questions of pat-
entability” that are better resolved under the substantive requirements 
for patentability.195 Turning to the ‘238 patent, Judge Newman asserts 
that it would be infringed merely “by reviewing information on 
whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of 
a chronic immune-mediated disorder” without “the subsequent step of 
immunization on an optimum schedule.”196 She concludes that the 
claims “do not include putting this knowledge to practical use, but are 
directed to the abstract principle that variation in immunization 
schedules may have consequences for certain diseases” and are there-
  
the treatment group, with that in the control group.” Id. at *8-9.  According to Judge 
Newman, “The ‘immunizing’ in the ‘283 patent refers to the gathering of published 
data, while the immunizing of the ‘139 and ‘739 patent claims is the physical imple-
mentation of the mental step claimed in the ‘283 patent.”  Id. at *25. 
 192 Id. at *21-24. 
 193 Id. at *24. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at *24. 
 196 Id. at *25. 
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fore too abstract to get past “the coarse filter of § 101.”197 She men-
tions the machine-or-transformation test only to explain the Supreme 
Court’s disapproval of it as the “sole test” of patent eligibility and to 
summarize Classen’s arguments for patent eligibility.198 
Two difficulties with this analysis make it problematic as an ex-
planation for the decision.  First, as noted previously, the ‘238 patent 
claim language, contrary to Judge Newman’s account, appears to re-
quire immunizing research subjects: 
 
A method of determining whether an immunization schedule 
affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated 
disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control 
group of mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in 
the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one 
or more immunogens, according to said immunization sched-
ule, and comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or se-
verity of said chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level 
of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with 
that in the control group.199 
 
That Judge Newman would attempt the difficult sleight of hand 
necessary to read this limitation out of the claim language suggests 
that the transformative step of bringing about bodily changes by ad-
ministering treatment to a mammal in fact does matter to her assess-
ment of patent eligibility, notwithstanding her avoidance of the label 
“machine-or-transformation” or other “categorical rules.”  
Second, if we take Judge Newman at her word that what matters 
is not chemical transformation in the bodies of immunized mammals, 
but the practical application of the lower-risk immunization schedule, 
then it is not clear why a method of determining whether an immuni-
zation schedule affects the incidence or severity of chronic immune-
mediated disorders fails that test. In biopharmaceutical fields, many 
patents cover inventions useful in drug development that do not recite 
steps of administering the as yet undiscovered drugs to patients. In 
fact, the one claim that was unanimously upheld by the panel in Asso-
ciation for Molecular Pathology—the claim to a method of screening 
potential cancer therapeutics—did not recite a step of administering 
the effective compounds to patients.200  Presumably, Judge Newman 
  
 197 Id. at *25-28. 
 198 Id. at *13, *26, *29. 
 199 Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283 claim 1 
(filed May 31, 2995). 
 200 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334. 
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does not mean to call into question the validity of these patents, yet it 
is unclear that they would pass the test of “practical use” that purport-
edly distinguishes the patent-eligible from patent-ineligible claims in 
Classen.  
In dissent, Judge Moore argues that, properly interpreted, the 
claims of the ‘238 patent are indistinguishable from those of the ‘139 
and ‘739  patents for § 101 purposes,201 and that all of them improp-
erly claim fundamental scientific principles: 
 
Having discovered a principle – that changing the timing of 
immunization may change the incidence of chronic immune 
mediated disorders –Classen now seeks to keep it for himself. 
In the ‘283 patent, he accomplishes this goal by claiming the 
use of the scientific method to study the incidence of chronic 
immune mediated disorders. This preempts the field of study, 
and prevents any investigation into any immunogen, known or 
unknown, and to any disease, known or unknown, over any pe-
riod of time. Where, as here, a patent preempts an idea, a basic 
building block of science, within a field of study, the patent in 
practical effect is a patent on the idea itself. 202 
 
Judge Moore repeatedly quotes Justice Breyer’s dissent in Labo-
ratory Corporation in arguing that allowing claims of the sort at issue 
would interfere with the development of further knowledge.203 Like 
Judge Newman, Judge Moore does not dwell on the machine-or-
transformation test. For Judge Moore the inclusion in the claims of a 
claim step of immunizing patients, whether subsequent to a compari-
son of immunization schedules as in the ‘139 and ‘739 patents or prior 
to that comparison as in the ‘238 patent, could not transform an un-
patentable principle into a patentable process; in the former case the 
immunizing step was “nothing more than post-solution activity” and 
in the latter case it was “nothing more than a data gathering step.”204 
Distinguishing Prometheus v. Mayo, she notes that the Prometheus 
court concluded that the claims in that case “were not merely data 
gathering steps or insignificant post-solution activity” and that be-
cause they were limited to the administration of specific drugs, they 
did not “preempt broadly the use of any natural correlation,” and 
faults the majority for failing to consider the preemptive sweep of 
  
 201 Classen Immunotherapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 at *51, *53-57, 
*54  n.1. 
 202 Id. at *60-61 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)).. 
 203 Id. at *61, *63. 
 204 Id. at *62. 
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Classen’s claims.205 She rejects the majority’s view that it was neces-
sary to consider the substantive conditions for patentability in order to 
invalidate these claims: 
 
When, as here, the claims so clearly offend the constitutional 
imperative to promote the useful arts, where they preempt all 
application of a principle or idea, it is entirely appropriate to 
hold them unpatentable subject matter before reaching antici-
pation, obviousness, or any other statutory section that might 
also prove invalidity.206  
 
In sum, the patentable subject matter cases decided by the Federal 
Circuit since the Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos reveal 
considerable disagreement within that court about the limitations of 
patentable subject matter and about the role those limitations should 
play in determining what may be patented. Without further clarifica-
tion from the Supreme Court, some members of the Federal Circuit 
seem ready to return to the pre-Bilski machine-or-transformation rule, 
while others seem ready to roll the clock back even further and return 
to the “useful, concrete, and tangible” rule of State Street Bank v. Sig-
nature Financial Group.207 Yet if the Justices agreed on anything 
about the contours of patentable subject matter in Bilski v. Kappos, it 
was that both of these positions get it wrong. 
 
III. IDENTIFYING THE PURPOSE OF SUBJECT MATTER 
BOUNDARIES 
 
The Supreme Court has directed the Federal Circuit to consult the 
statute and Supreme Court precedent in elaborating rules of patentable 
subject matter, but the task of extrapolating from these sources to ad-
dress unresolved issues is challenging without more clarity as to the 
purposes and functions of subject matter boundaries in the patent sys-
tem. The majority opinion in Bilski v. Kappos avoids reference to any 
policy moorings that might either guide the interpretation of prior 
decisions or steer courts in future cases. But without understanding 
what patentable subject matter boundaries are supposed to accom-
plish, it is difficult to figure out where those boundaries belong. 
Earlier judicial opinions have advanced policy arguments in favor 
of exclusions from patentable subject matter that overlap with policies 
served by other doctrinal limitations on what may be patented, invit-
  
 205 Id. at *53. 
 206 Id. at *66. 
 207 See supra note 13. 
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ing the argument that patentable subject matter is redundant to these 
other limitations.208 For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
justified exclusions of “fundamental principles,” “abstract ideas” and 
“mathematical algorithms” by invoking concerns about allowing un-
duly broad patent rights.209 But patent law addresses this concern 
elsewhere by limiting the allowable scope of patent claims to exclude 
prior art210 and nonenabled embodiments.211 Indeed, some of the older 
precedents date back to a time before the statute explicitly distin-
guished “patentable subject matter” from other doctrinal limitations 
on the allowance of patents, making it difficult to map the basis for 
those decisions onto modern doctrinal categories.212 
Commentators have stepped into the void, producing a rich and 
varied scholarly literature. Some scholars find unarticulated normative 
intuitions lurking behind the boundaries laid down in prior decisions 
and seek to guide courts, Congress, and the PTO to use subject matter 
boundaries to ensure that the patent system continues to advance simi-
lar normative goals today.213 Some see the boundaries as failed at-
tempts to lay down rules that have inevitably become outmoded in the 
face of technological change, preferring other doctrinal tools for iden-
tifying what is and is not patentable that offer more flexible standards 
and have proven more stable over time.214 Some attempt to disaggre-
  
 208 See Risch, supra note 2; Duffy, supra note 33. 
 209 E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68, 72 (1972) (“Here the ‘proc-
ess’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of 
the BCD to pure binary conversion …. [T]he patent would wholly preempt the 
mathematical formula and, in practical effect, would be a patent of the algorithm 
itself.”); see also Collins, supra note 33, at 50-53 (discussing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 
U.S. 62 (1853)). 
 210 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2010). 
 211 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). 
 212 E.g., Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
 213 E.g., Olson, supra note 64 (arguing that until recently courts deployed 
patentable subject matter to exclude categories of invention that did not require patent 
incentives, using an implicit but unarticulated economic analysis to determine which 
fields would exhibit public goods problems that would lead to underproduction of 
inventions in the absence of patents, and that under that analysis business methods 
should be excluded); Yu, supra note 33 (arguing that patentable subject matter should 
ensure that patents advance Constitutional goal of promoting progress of science and 
useful arts by excluding basic tools of scientific and technological work, distinguish-
ing invention from discovery, and defining subject matter boundaries consistent with 
industrial policy). 
 214 See Duffy, supra note 33, at 614 (arguing that over time clear “rules” 
restricting patentable subject matter have proven unstable in the face of technological 
change relative to more flexible “standards,” and that other patent law “standards,” 
such as nonobviousness and enablement, better address concerns about excessive 
patenting than rigid exclusionary rules); Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: 
Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 356 n.5 
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gate the limitations on patentable subject matter in order to sharpen 
and distinguish criticisms that apply to some parts of the doctrine but 
not others.215 Some take the boundaries as given and try to identify 
interpretive moves that will better advance normative goals within 
those constraints.216 And some would largely eliminate patentable 
subject matter limitations, relying on other rules of patent law to sepa-
rate the patentable wheat from the unpatentable chaff.217 
 
A. Threshold Inquiry 
 
The closest that prior decisions have come to distinguishing the 
function of patentable subject matter from the functions of other pat-
ent law doctrines is the characterization of patentable subject matter as 
a “threshold inquiry” or the “first door” an invention must pass 
through in order to get a patent. This image, which appears in deci-
sions of the Supreme Court,218 the Federal Circuit,219 and the Court of 
  
(2003) (“Adjustments in patentable subject matter standards frequently follow 
changes in technological knowledge. These adjustments are needed to maintain patent 
incentives as inducements for design efforts and disclosures in new technological 
realms.”). 
 215 Chiang, supra note 33 (distinguishing two kinds of patentable subject 
matter limitations that present different costs and benefits: (1) categorical exclusions, 
which trade off administrative cost savings against the costs of over- and under-
inclusiveness; and (2) scope limitations, which are more costly to administer but less 
prone to error); Duffy, supra note 33 at 614 (distinguishing patentable subject matter 
“rules” from “standards”). See also Collins, supra note 55 (arguing that the focus on 
the machine-or-transformation test has led to miscoding of determine-and-infer 
claims as possibly within exclusion for “abstract ideas” rather than as possibly within 
exclusion for “mental processes”). 
 216 E.g., Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “an Unpatentable Abstract 
Idea”, supra note 33 (identifying multiple distinct meanings of “abstract idea” that 
raise different concerns and merit different treatment). 
 217 E.g., Risch, supra note 2; Osenga, supra note 31.  
 218 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (“The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a 
threshold test. Even if an invention qualifies as a process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, in order to receive the Patent Act’s protection the claimed 
invention must also satisfy ‘the conditions and requirements of this title.’ § 101. 
Those requirements include that the invention be novel, see § 102, nonobvious, see § 
103, and fully and particularly described, see § 112.”). 
 219 In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We do not reach the 
ground relied on by the Board below … because we conclude that many of the claims 
are ‘barred at the threshold by § 101.’ It is well-established that ‘[t]he first door which 
must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101.’ … Only if the require-
ments of § 101 are satisfied is the inventor ‘allowed to pass through to’ the other 
requirements for patentability, such as novelty under § 102 and, of pertinence to this 
case, non-obviousness under § 103.”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter under § 
101 is a threshold inquiry, and any claim of an application failing the requirements of 
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Customs and Patent Appeals,220 suggests a gatekeeper role for paten-
table subject matter at the point of entry to the patent system, provid-
ing a rough first cut that leaves some kinds of inventions outside the 
system while admitting others to be examined more closely within the 
PTO to determine their patentability. Subject matter exclusions that 
may be applied at the front door of the patent system (such as, for 
example, a rule that excludes “business methods” from patentable 
subject matter) could potentially reduce administrative costs of the 
patent system by restricting the number of patent applications that 
require more costly individualized examination.   
Such a threshold rule is especially attractive if the excluded sub-
ject matter either does not require the incentive of patent protection or 
would not get past the additional tests of patentability that are admin-
istered in the course of examination. On the other hand, to the extent 
that the rule excludes subject matter that might otherwise pass these 
tests and withholds patents from fields that might benefit from patent 
incentives, it may be criticized as “eliminating broad swaths of inno-
vation with a machete” when a more carefully deployed “scalpel” 
would do a better job of promoting progress.221 But as Professor Tun-
Jen Chiang explains, this tradeoff between administrative costs and 
over- and under-inclusiveness is inherent in the choice of a bright-line 
rule over more discriminating standards.222 
A number of problems limit the value of patentable subject matter 
as a threshold test.  First, if the threshold test is to provide a useful 
screen, the exclusions should rest on at least a rough assessment of 
whether patent protection is socially desirable for different categories 
of invention, thereby excluding patents in areas where they are either 
  
§ 101 must be rejected even if it meets all of the other legal requirements of pat-
entability.”), but cf. id. at 950 n.1 (“Although our decision in Comiskey may be mis-
read by some as requiring in every case that the examiner conduct a § 101 analysis 
before assessing any other issue of patentability, we did not so hold. As with any 
other patentability requirement, an examiner may reject a claim solely on the basis of 
§ 101. Or, if the examiner deems it appropriate, she may reject the claim on any other 
ground(s) without addressing § 101. But given that § 101 is a threshold requirement, 
claims that are clearly drawn to unpatentable subject matter should be identified and 
rejected on that basis. Thus, an examiner should generally first satisfy herself that the 
application’s claims are drawn to patent-eligible subject matter.”). 
 220 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (“The first door which must be 
opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101 …. If the invention, as the inven-
tor defines it in his claims … falls into any one of the named categories, he is allowed 
to pass through to the second door, which is § 102; ‘novelty and loss of right to pat-
ent’ is the sign on it.”). 
 221 Risch, supra note 2, at 658; Duffy, supra note 33, at 622-23. 
 222 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1357-63. 
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unnecessary to promote innovation or impose monopoly costs that 
exceed corresponding benefits in the form of innovation incentives.223 
Yet in the absence of systematic investigations of these effects by 
policymakers, judicial exclusions from patentable subject matter rest 
at best on seat-of-the-pants intuitions of jurists from earlier eras. Ac-
cording to Professor David Olson, courts in the past “implicitly ana-
lyzed” the economic effects of patents by subject matter area in de-
veloping rules that “distinguish, albeit not explicitly, efficient from 
inefficient subject matter for patentability,”224 but beginning with the 
1980 decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
courts have “largely abandoned any gatekeeping role” in favor of a 
broad reading of statutory standards for patentable subject matter.225 
But the attribution of implicit economic analysis to courts of the past 
is fraught with possibilities for misunderstanding, projection and revi-
sionist history. Moreover, if one trusts that the decisions of judges are 
guided by economic intuitions that they fail to articulate, it is not clear 
why one would have more confidence in the decisions that restricted 
patentable subject matter in the distant past than in the decisions that 
expanded patentable subject matter in the recent past. Either way, it 
takes a leap of faith to believe that the rules courts devise are smarter 
than the reasons they adduce in support of those rules. The less confi-
dence one has that the rules of patentable subject matter correspond 
even roughly to the goals of the patent system, the less sense it makes 
to assign a gatekeeper function to those rules. 
Second, in order to provide a means for economizing on adminis-
trative costs, patentable subject matter exclusions must provide clear 
rules that can be applied without the need for individualized examina-
tion. While some exclusions from patentable subject matter have pro-
vided clear rules for a period of time, such as past exclusions for busi-
ness methods and living things,226 often these exclusions have eventu-
ally proven to be overinclusive in the face of technological change.227 
  
 223 Olson, supra note 64, at 203 (“[T]he critical first inquiry for the patentabil-
ity of an invention should be whether the invention is within a subject matter area that 
is subject to a public goods problem such that absent patent protection an underpro-
duction of inventions in that subject matter will result.  If a public goods problem 
exists, then the subject matter should be patentable and the other tests for patentability 
should be applied.  If no public goods problem exists, either because of the nature of 
the subject matter, or because other factors exist that adequately incentive production 
of the public good, then subject matter patentability should be denied and the pat-
entability inquiry should end.”). 
 224 Id. at 205-15. 
 225 Id. at 214-15. 
 226 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1382-83; Duffy, supra note 33 at 623-38. 
 227 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1383-85; Duffy, supra note 33, at 616-17.  
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Technological change makes categorical exclusions that may have 
made sense in an earlier era seem out of date and unworkable. Thus an 
exclusion for living things, taken for granted as long as that category 
overlapped substantially with products of nature, became anomalous 
with the advent of genetic engineering,228 an exclusion for mathemati-
cal algorithms became problematic when the advent of computers 
made the execution of algorithms by machine a field of applied tech-
nology and incorporated information technology into industrial proc-
esses,229 and an exclusion for business methods became problematic 
when information technology and the internet blurred the boundaries 
between business and technology.230 As Professor John Duffy has 
documented, bright-line rules have difficulty keeping up with techno-
logical change, which is especially challenging for a legal regime that 
functions to promote technological change.231 Those categorical ex-
clusions that are clear enough to be applied by a bouncer at the front 
door of the PTO may thus become unstable over time. 
Conversely, subject matter exclusions that operate as flexible 
standards, such as that for “abstract ideas,” have proven more durable 
over time, but their meaning is too vague and uncertain for them to 
serve as gatekeepers in a way that economizes on administrative costs.  
Critics of patentable subject matter doctrine cite its lack of clarity 
relative to other requirements for patent protection,232 suggesting that 
administrative efficiency might be better served by proceeding di-
rectly to individualized examination. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has 
recognized the impracticality of requiring that patentable subject mat-
ter determinations precede full examination in every case and clarified 
that, contrary to the implication of the phrase “threshold test,” there is 
no rule that requires that patentable subject matter be considered first 
when it might be more expeditious to dispose of an application on 
another ground.233  
Patentable subject matter also fails to economize on administra-
tive costs when it operates as a limitation on allowable claim language 
and scope rather than as a complete exclusion from the patent system. 
As categorical field exclusions have disappeared, remaining limita-
  
 228 Duffy, supra note 33, at 625-32; Eisenberg, supra note 1. 
 229 Olson, supra note 64, at 206-18. 
 230 Id. at 218-24. 
 231 Duffy, supra note 33, at 616 (“[C]hanging conditions present well-known 
difficulties for rules, and the law of patentable subject matter inevitably operates on 
the ever-changing forefront of human knowledge and creativity.”). 
 232 Risch, supra note 2, at 606-07 (“Attention to rigorous application of the 
patentability standards would replace unclear and undefined subject matter rules 
based on supportable statutory interpretations of the Patent Act.”). 
 233 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 n.1 (Fed Cir. 2008). 
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tions on patentable subject matter, such as the exclusions for abstract 
ideas and natural phenomena, are more likely to require careful claim-
drafting than to keep an invention from crossing the threshold of the 
PTO. As Professor Chiang explains, the prohibitions on patenting 
abstract ideas and scientific principles are not about excluding certain 
subject matter from the patent system entirely but rather about avoid-
ing unduly broad claims.234 Inventors can often respond by narrowing 
their claims, and it requires the attention of an examiner to determine 
which of the claims in a patent application are worded so broadly that 
they wholly preempt the use of an abstract idea or a natural correlation 
and which are permissibly confined to particular applications. Such 
limitations may be useful as a means of avoiding the allowance of 
unduly broad claims, but they do not serve as threshold tests that 
economize on administrative costs.   
In sum, although one could imagine patentable subject matter 
serving a useful role as a threshold inquiry, economizing on adminis-
trative costs by excluding some kinds of subject matter from the front 
door of the patent system without the need for a full examination, 
patentable subject matter doctrine does not and cannot serve that role 
in its current form. 
 
B. Limiting heterogeneity 
 
A different function for patentable subject matter boundaries may 
be to limit the technological diversity of inventions that must be ac-
commodated in a one-size fits all patent system.235  By longstanding 
tradition, now locked in by treaty,236 the U.S. patent laws apply essen-
tially the same rules of patent law across all fields of technology.237 
  
 234 Chiang, supra note 33, at 1385-92 (explaining Supreme Court decisions in 
O’Reilly v. Morse, The Telephone Cases, Funk v. Kalo, and Gottschalk v. Benson as 
concerned with unduly broad claims). 
 235 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law & Economics Agenda for the 
Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2000). 
 236 Agreement on Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 
27, Apr.15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (commonly known as the TRIPS Agreement), Art. 27, 
§ 1(“[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in 
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application. … [P]atents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to … the field of technology ….”). 
 237 Congress has nonetheless sometimes enacted field-specific patent law 
provisions, including a prior user defense against infringement of business method 
patents, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2010), relief from the nonobviousness requirement for 
certain biotechnology process claims, 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2010), relief from remedies 
for infringement of patents by medical practitioners and related health care entities, 
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2010), and term extensions for drug patents, 35 U.S.C. § 155 
 
        JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET      [Vol. 3:1] 
48 
 
Yet economic research has repeatedly demonstrated that the needs of 
innovators for patent protection vary significantly across fields.238 
Because of variation in the conditions for innovation, patent rules that 
provide the correct balance between patent incentives and competition 
in one field are likely to get the balance wrong in other fields, provid-
ing too much protection in some contexts and too little in others. Pro-
fessor Michael Carroll calls the resulting inefficiencies “uniformity 
costs.”239   
Patentable subject matter boundaries can help to minimize uni-
formity costs by limiting the diversity of innovations that patent law 
covers, thus making it easier to achieve a more optimal level of pro-
tection for a narrower range of innovations. The challenge of arriving 
at rules of patent law that satisfy the diverse denizens of the patent 
system today is visible in the divergent positions of different indus-
tries concerning patent law reform. Relative newcomers to the patent 
system—mostly from the information technology and service sec-
tors—have favored reforms that old-timers such as the pharmaceutical 
industry have opposed.240 New categories of patentable subject matter 
also pose administrative challenges for the PTO, which initially may 
lack the necessary expertise and record of prior art to evaluate patent 
applications properly in new fields.241 Perhaps a less diverse commu-
nity of innovators, maintained through the use of patentable subject 
matter boundaries to exclude newcomers, would more readily agree 
on what the rules should be. 
  
(2010).  The recently passed Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 
(Sept. 16, 2011) extends prior user rights to all fields of technology, id. § 5 (codified 
at 35 U.S.C. § 273) and eliminates special rules for evaluating the nonobviousness of 
biotechnological processes, id. § 3(c) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103) but has additional 
field-specific provisions treating tax strategies as prior art, id. § 14, providing a transi-
tional period of post-grant review of business method patents, id. § 18, and prohibit-
ing the issuance of patents on human organisms, id. § 33,  
 238 See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND 
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (discussing the economic analysis and rapid 
changes that have occurred since 2003 in patent reform). 
 239 See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All:  A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Michael W. 
Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 
55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 849 (2006) (defining uniformity cost as “the distortions 
caused by rights that are more or less robust than necessary to have induced invest-
ments in innovation that deliver a net benefit to society.”). 
 240 Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 389 (2007). 
 241 See Merges, supra note 64, at 589-91 (1999) (describing initial difficulties 
for the PTO in examining applications in the areas of business methods, biotechnol-
ogy, and software). 
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This picture of the patent system as a gated community, with sub-
ject matter boundaries to exclude newcomers, invites a number of 
objections. First, although subject matter boundaries may limit uni-
formity costs for those fields that remain patent eligible, they do noth-
ing to achieve the correct balance between incentives and competition 
for excluded fields. Unless there is reason to believe that patent pro-
tection is unnecessary for the excluded fields, the resulting uneven 
pattern of protection seems at least as likely to create distortions and 
inefficiencies as a uniform set of rules applied to diverse fields. It 
seems especially problematic to exclude new fields from patent pro-
tection, since the development of new technologies may have far 
greater social value than incremental improvements in existing 
fields.242 Even a requirement for explicit Congressional action to ex-
tend patent protection to new fields of technology would add another 
layer of costs and uncertainty to pathbreaking innovations, creating a 
risk that new technologies could get delayed or derailed.  
From a political economy perspective, having diverse interests 
with a stake in the patent system may be advantageous if it provokes 
vigorous debate about public policy initiatives.  Otherwise, like-
minded firms might encounter little opposition when they lobby for 
legislative changes that are more likely to advance their private inter-
ests than to balance competing interests in innovation and competi-
tion. In other words, uniformity costs from a patent system that seeks 
to regulate diverse interests may be preferable to unchecked rent-
seeking in a system that is more narrowly tailored to affect concen-
trated interests.243 
Finally, even if patentable subject matter boundaries might be de-
ployed to minimize uniformity costs, current patentable subject matter 
doctrine is not well-suited to that task, for essentially the same reasons 
that it is not well-suited to serve as a gatekeeper at the threshold to the 
patent system. Uniformity calls for field exclusions of a sort that the 
courts have repeatedly rejected, rather than for vague crosscutting 
  
 242 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) (“[Parker v.] Flook 
did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Con-
gress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se.  To read that con-
cept into Flook would frustrate the purposes of the patent law. This Court frequently 
has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the ‘particular application[s] … 
contemplated by the legislators.’ [] This is especially true in the field of patent law. A 
rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would conflict with the core 
concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.”) 
 243 WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (AEI Press 2004), available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_Landes.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).  
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standards, such as the exclusion for “abstract ideas,” that do not corre-
spond to field distinctions in any apparent way. And of course, if the 
goal is to exclude those fields in which less protection is optimal, it 
would make sense to engage in policy analysis, largely absent in the 
current system, to identify which fields belong inside and outside pat-
entable subject matter boundaries. 
 
C. Beyond the threshold: public domain, claim scope and 
building blocks 
 
Most patentable subject matter decisions that invalidate some 
claims spare other claims in the same patent or application, suggesting 
that patentable subject matter is functioning as a scalpel that deter-
mines how inventions may be claimed rather than as a barricade that 
excludes certain categories of invention entirely. Even if patentable 
subject matter doctrine lacks the necessary clarity and field specificity 
to function as an efficient threshold test, it might still provide a useful 
tool for the PTO and the courts to use in denying or invalidating par-
ticular patent claims that threaten to impose costs that exceed their 
benefits. Some scholars have suggested that patentable subject matter 
is redundant to other doctrinal limitations on patentability that would 
support the same outcomes, raising the question of whether it is nec-
essary or appropriate to use patentable subject matter limitations to do 
this work.244  But these other doctrines may sometimes fail, leaving 
patentable subject matter limitations as a backstop.  Doctrinal redun-
dancy is a common feature of legal systems and may make sense if 
the interest at stake is important.  
 
1. Prior Art 
 
Some cases about the exclusion of natural products and phenom-
ena of nature from patentable subject matter suggest a concern that the 
claimed invention is largely the handiwork of nature, and that the 
value-added of the inventor is relatively slight. For example, in Funk 
Brothers Seed v. Kalo Inoculant,245 the Court held invalid a claim to a 
mixed culture of bacterial strains that were selected by the inventor 
for their capacity to allow plants to fix nitrogen from the environment 
without inhibiting each other’s effectiveness. The Court’s description 
contrasts the wonders of nature with the inventor’s trivial advance in 
packaging: 
  
 244 E.g., Risch, supra note 2, at 598. 
 245 Funk Brothers Seed v. Kalo Inoculant 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
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Bond does not create a state of inhibition or of noninhibi-
tion in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. 
Those qualities are, of course, not patentable. For patents 
cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of na-
ture. The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse 
of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.  
….  
The aggregation of select strains of the several species 
into one product is an application of that newly discov-
ered natural principle. But however ingenious the discov-
ery of that natural principle may have been, the applica-
tion of it is hardly more than an advance in the packaging 
of the inoculants.  
….  
[O]nce nature’s secret of the noninhibitive quality of cer-
tain strains of the species of Rhizobium was discovered, 
the state of the art made the production of a mixed inocu-
lant a simple step. Even though it may have been the 
product of skill, it certainly was not the product of inven-
tion.246 
 
This analysis does not rest entirely on the exclusion of phe-
nomena of nature from patentable subject matter. Indeed it can-
not, because the Court concedes that Bond’s “aggregation of 
select strains … into one product is an application of that newly 
discovered natural principle” rather than a claim to the natural 
principle itself.247  It is difficult to imagine what a claim to the 
natural principle itself would look like or what it would mean. 
As Professor Collins explains, 
 
On its face, this prohibition on claiming unapplied natural 
principles and the like might seem simply to mean that Ein-
stein cannot claim E=mc2 itself and Newton cannot claim the 
universal law of gravitation itself. However, the doctrine of 
patent eligibility would not be needed to keep such direct 
  
 246 Id. at 130-32 (citations omitted). 
 247 Id. 
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claims to newly discovered principles, truths, or laws out of 
the patent regime. They are patent gibberish. Patent claims de-
scribing “the state of affairs in which E=mc2” are malformed 
in that they don’t describe a set of things or processes at all.248 
 
The ground for invalidation of Bond’s claim to the mixed 
culture seems to be as much about the obviousness of the inven-
tor’s aggregation of strains (“a simple step … not the product of 
invention”)249 as it is about the exclusion of the phenomena of 
nature from patentability.   
Essential to the Court’s conclusion that the mixed culture 
was “not the product of invention” is its treatment of the newly 
discovered properties of the bacteria as “part of the storehouse 
of knowledge of all men.”250  In effect, the Court treats Bond’s 
discovery of noninhibitive strains as if that much of his contri-
bution were prior art, and concludes that the further step of 
combining those strains in a mixed culture was nothing more 
than the exercise of “ordinary skill.” Prior251 and subsequent252 
cases have taken a similar approach, treating excluded subject 
matter as if it were prior art in evaluating the patentability of the 
claimed invention. This approach seems to have one foot in the 
doctrine of patentable subject matter and the other in prior art 
doctrines such as novelty and nonobviousness.   
Judge Giles Rich, one of the principal architects of the 1952 
Patent Act, criticized this approach as fundamentally confused 
in an opinion for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 
the case of In re Bergy that borders on insubordination.253 The 
Supreme Court had vacated and remanded for reconsideration in 
  
 248 Collins, supra note 33 at 56-57. 
 249 Funk Bros. Seed, 333 U.S. at 132. 
 250 Id. at 130. 
 251 E.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 115 (quoting with approval the fol-
lowing passage from the decision in Neilson and others v. Harford and others in the 
English Court of Exchequer:  “[T]he plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but a 
machine, embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must be 
considered as if the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a 
mode of applying it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces ….”). 
 252 E.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978) (“Whether the algo-
rithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as one of 
the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work,’ it is treated as though it were a 
familiar part of the prior art.”) (citation omitted). 
 253 596 F.2d 952, 959 (CCPA 1979). 
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light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Flook.254 
Judge Rich took the opportunity instead to criticize the Supreme 
Court’s approach, stating that “we find in Flook an unfortunate and 
apparently unconscious, though clear, commingling of distinct statu-
tory provisions which are conceptually unrelated, namely, those per-
taining to the categories of inventions in § 101 which may be paten-
table and to the conditions for patentability demanded by the statute 
for inventions within the statutory categories, particularly the nonob-
viousness condition of § 103….”255 Focusing on the statement in 
Flook “that a ‘mathematical algorithm’ or formula is like a law of 
nature in that it is one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technologi-
cal work’ and as such must be deemed to be ‘a familiar part of the 
prior art,’ even when it was not familiar, was not prior, was discov-
ered by the applicant for patent, was novel at the time he discovered 
it, and was useful,” Judge Rich warned that “[t]his gives to the term 
‘prior art,’ which is a very important term of art in patent law, particu-
larly in the application of § 103, an entirely new dimension with con-
sequences of unforeseeable magnitude.”256 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the 
approach of treating natural products and phenomena as prior art. In 
Diamond v. Diehr, the Court even cited Judge Rich’s opinion in Bergy 
with approval for the proposition that the question of whether a par-
ticular invention meets the test of novelty under § 102 is “wholly apart 
from whether the invention falls into a category of patentable subject 
matter.”257 Yet the Court has never explicitly overruled the approach 
of the prior decisions, and in Bilski v. Kappos the Court quoted the 
same passage from Parker v. Flook that Judge Rich had criticized in 
Bergy without expressing any disapproval.258 
  
 254 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (CCPA 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. 
Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). 
 255 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 256 Id. at 965-66 (emphasis in original).  If the Court’s approach represented a 
departure from the scheme of the Patent Act at the time, Congress more recently 
appears to be following the Court’s lead by providing for the treatment of “any strat-
egy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at 
the time of the invention or application for patent,” as if it were a part of the prior art 
in evaluating inventions for patentability.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29 §14,(a) (Sept. 16, 2011).  
 257 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1980) (citing In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 
at 961). 
 258 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 1330 (“The Court concluded that the process at issue 
there was ‘unpatentable under § 101, not because it contain[ed] a mathematical algo-
rithm as one component, but because once that algorithm [wa]s assumed to be within 
the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contain[ed] no patentable inven-
tion.’”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594). 
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Some scholars have responded to the recent revival of paten-
table subject matter limitations by arguing that subject matter 
exclusions are redundant to other limitations on what may be 
patented, including those based on prior art. Professor Michael 
Risch argues that cases like Parker v. Flook could be resolved 
through rigorous application of prior art doctrines without the 
need for murky rules concerning patentable subject matter,259 
while Professor Kristen Osenga criticizes the PTO and courts 
for use of subject matter exclusions as “proxies for other diffi-
cult questions of patentability and policy.”260 
However, it is not at all clear that existing prior art doctrine 
on its own would provide an alternative basis for the holdings 
that the Supreme Court arrived at through its patentable subject 
matter jurisprudence.  The Patent Act itemizes the available 
categories of prior art in § 102.261 Each of the categories listed in 
the statute identifies a prior source of human knowledge with no 
mention of products or phenomena of nature that have not yet 
come to the attention of humans.  Section 102 thus precludes the 
patenting of an invention if it was previously known or used by 
others,262 patented or described in a printed publication,263 in 
public use or on sale,264 disclosed in a co-pending patent appli-
cation,265 and so forth.  Products and phenomena of nature 
would seem to count as prior art only to the extent that they fall 
into one of the categories listed in § 102. In other words, with-
out assistance from the doctrine of patentable subject matter, 
  
 259 Risch, supra note 2, at 598-609. 
 260 Osenga, supra note 31, at 1115-23. 
 261 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“[I]n 1952 Congress 
voiced its intent to consider the novelty of an invention under § 102 where it is first 
made clear what the statute means by ‘new’, notwithstanding the fact that this re-
quirement is first named in § 101.”).  The same list determines the sources of 
prior art for evaluating the nonobviousness of an invention under 35 U.S.C. § 
103 (2010).  Hazeltine Research v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1965) (§ 
102(e)); In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (§ 102(b)); In re Bass, 
474 F.2d 1276, 1287 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (§ 102(g)); Oddzon Products v. Just 
Toys, 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (§102(f)). 
 262 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010). 
 263 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) - (b) (2010). 
 264 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2010). 
 265 35 U.S.C. § 102 (e) (2010). 
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newly discovered products and phenomena of nature do not 
seem to qualify as prior art under § 102 alone.266   
In a challenge to the validity of patents on isolated and puri-
fied DNA sequences, Professor Oskar Liivak has argued that 
patent claims to products isolated from nature violate a Consti-
tutional requirement of originality, codified at § 102(f) in a pro-
vision that precludes the issuance of a patent if the applicant 
“did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented.”267 This provision is generally understood to prohibit the 
patenting of an invention by one who derived it from someone 
else.268 Professor Liivak believes that the same limitation applies 
(or should apply) to inventions that are derived from nature.269 
Moreover, consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court, 
he would count material derived from nature as prior art in 
evaluating the obviousness of inventions that have been modi-
fied through human intervention.270 But there is little authority 
to support this interpretation of current law; indeed, none of the 
four judges—three on the Federal Circuit and one on the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York—who considered 
the patent eligibility of claims to isolated and purified DNA se-
quences in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office271 even mentioned derivation or § 102(f), resting 
  
 266 But cf. Collins, supra note 33, at 57 (arguing that claims to phenomena of 
nature “would be 
inherently anticipated under section 102, as the states of affairs described by the 
claims long predated their discovery by humankind.”). 
 267 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2010); see Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality 
Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2005). This provision will be eliminated for claims with an effective 
filing date after March 16, 2013 under § 3 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29 (Sept. 16, 2011).. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior 
Art Problems with the New Patent Act, available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/files/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf (visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 268 See Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“To show derivation, the party asserting invalidity must prove both 
prior conception of the invention by another and communication of that conception to 
the patentee.”). 
 269 Liivak, supra note 267, at 265. 
 270 Id. at 291-92 (citing Oddzon Products v. Just Toys, 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997)). 
 271 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS) 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011).   
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instead on §101 and cases excluding products of nature from paten-
table subject matter. 
In sum, although some patentable subject matter decisions con-
cerning products and phenomena of nature appear to rest in part on 
considerations of novelty, originality, and nonobviousness that find 
expression elsewhere in the Patent Act, prevailing interpretations of 
these other statutory provisions do not make these subject matter limi-
tations redundant.  Instead, to the extent that the patentable subject 
matter cases remain good law, they seem to go beyond the definitions 
of prior art in the statute and case law to exclude newly discovered 
natural products and phenomena, and obvious variations of them, 
from patent protection. 
 
2. Claim Scope 
 
Many patentable subject matter cases reflect a concern that the in-
validated claims are unduly broad. An early example is O’Reilly v. 
Morse,272 in which the Supreme Court held invalid the eighth claim of 
a patent to Samuel Morse on his invention of the telegraph machine: 
 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery 
or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specifi-
cation and claims; the essence of my invention being the 
use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic cur-
rent, which I call electromagnetism, however developed, 
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or let-
ters at any distances, being a new application of that 
power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discov-
erer.273 
 
In invalidating this claim, the Court stressed that its broad 
scope would give Morse control over future advances yet to be 
made by others.274 The Court worried that Morse could dominate 
  
 272 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).  
 273 Id. at 112. 
 274 Id. at 113 (“If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process 
or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know, some future 
inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing 
at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of 
the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. … But yet if it is 
covered by this patent, the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of 
it, without the permission of this patentee.”) 
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future advances without having to seek additional patent rights, and 
therefore without providing further disclosure: 
 
[T]he patentee would be able to avail himself of new discover-
ies in the properties and powers of electro-magnetism which 
scientific men might bring to light. … And if he can secure the 
exclusive use by his present patent, he may vary it with every 
new discovery and development of the science, and need place 
no description of the new manner, process, or machinery upon 
the records of the patent office.…In fine, he claims an exclu-
sive right to use a manner and process which he has not de-
scribed and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not 
describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of opinion 
that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.275 
 
The Court’s repeated observation that the eighth claim extends 
beyond the specific means disclosed by Morse in his specification276 
suggests to some commentators that the best way to understand the 
holding is that the eighth claim was not properly enabled by the dis-
closure.277 Yet the opinion also recites that “the discovery of a prin-
ciple in natural philosophy or physical science is not paten-
table,”278 and subsequent cases have cited O’Reilly v. Morse as 
authority for the exclusion of fundamental principles and abstract 
ideas from patentable subject matter.279 
A similar concern with claim scope appears in many subsequent 
cases invalidating particular claims as drawn to fundamental princi-
ples and abstract ideas. For example, the Supreme Court in Gottschalk 
v. Benson observed that the claim it held invalid for lack of patentable 
subject matter was “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both 
known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conver-
sion” and that “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical 
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm 
itself.”280 This theme reappears in Bilski v. Kappos, in which the Su-
preme Court notes that “[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk hedging 
  
 275 Id. at 113. 
 276 Id. at 118-21. 
 277 See Risch, supra note 2, at 600-01; Duffy, supra note 33, at 641-42 (citing 
late 19th century sources). 
 278 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 116. 
 279 E.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978). 
 280 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68. 
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would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effec-
tively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”281   
The Federal Circuit has also used patentable subject matter doc-
trine to invalidate broad claims. For example, in its 1989 decision in 
In re Grams,282 the Federal Circuit upheld a rejection for lack of pat-
entable subject matter of an astonishingly broad claim to “a method of 
diagnosing an abnormal condition in an individual” by performing 
clinical laboratory tests, comparing the parameter values for the indi-
vidual with reference values, and determining whether there are any 
abnormalities.283 The Federal Circuit held that the claim was improp-
erly drawn to a mathematical algorithm, noting that although the 
claim refers to the performance of clinical tests, the patent disclosure 
“does not bulge with disclosure about those tests, and indeed the 
specification states that ‘the invention is applicable to any complex 
system, whether it be electrical, mechanical, chemical or biological, or 
combinations thereof.’”284 The court concluded that “applicants are, in 
essence, claiming the mathematical algorithm, which they cannot do 
under Gottschalk v. Benson. The presence of a physical step in the 
claim to derive data for the algorithm will not render the claim statu-
tory.”285 
In each of these cases the courts see the breadth of the claim as 
indicating that it is not limited to a particular application of the princi-
  
 281 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
 282 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 283 The full claim reads:  “1.  A method of diagnosing an abnormal condition 
in an individual, the individual being characterized by a plurality of correlated pa-
rameters of a set of such parameters that is representative of the individual’s condi-
tion, the parameters comprising data resulting from a plurality of clinical laboratory 
tests which measure the levels of chemical and biological constituents of the individ-
ual [sic] and each parameter having a reference range of values, the method compris-
ing [a] performing said plurality of clinical laboratory tests on the individual to meas-
ure the values of the set of parameters; [b] producing from the set of measured pa-
rameter values and the reference ranges of values a first quantity representative of the 
condition of the individual; [c] comparing the first quantity to a first predetermined 
value to determine whether the individual’s condition is abnormal; [d] upon determin-
ing from said comparing that the individual’s condition is abnormal, successively 
testing a plurality of different combinations of the constituents of the individual by 
eliminating parameters from the set to form subsets corresponding to said combina-
tions, producing for each subset a second quantity, and comparing said second quan-
tity with a second predetermined value to detect a non-significant deviation from a 
normal condition; and [e] identifying as a result of said testing a complementary 
subset of parameters corresponding to a combination of constituents responsible for 
the abnormal condition, said complementary subset comprising the parameters elimi-
nated from the set so as to produce a subset having said non-significant deviation 
from a normal condition.” Id. at 836-37 (emphasis and alteration appear in decision). 
 284 Id. at 840. 
 285 Id. 
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ple/idea/algorithm, but reaches beyond that application to claim the 
principle/idea/algorithm itself. In other words, claim scope is what 
distinguishes an unpatentable principle/idea/algorithm from its patent-
eligible particular applications.286 
If the problem with the claims in these cases is that they are un-
duly broad, arguably the statutory grounds for invalidity should be 
failure of enablement under § 112 of the Patent Act287 rather than lack 
of patentable subject matter under of § 101 of the Patent Act. But en-
ablement doctrine hardly offers any clearer or more predictable tools 
than patentable subject matter for discerning the allowable scope of 
patent claims. Although some judicial decisions say that claim scope 
must be commensurate with the scope of embodiments that have been 
enabled by the patent disclosure,288 others say that the requirement of 
an enabling disclosure is satisfied if the specification provides an ena-
bling disclosure of a single embodiment falling within the scope of a 
claim.289 Patent claims must extend beyond the particular disclosed 
embodiments in order to have any value, and enablement doctrine 
offers inconsistent guidance about how far beyond those embodiments 
a claim may reach.290   
Particularly problematic for enablement doctrine are claims that 
cover future embodiments using technologies that have yet to be in-
vented as of the filing date. Some decisions say that such claims fail 
  
 286 Cf. Collins, supra note 33, at 50 (noting that one possible meaning of “an 
unpatentable abstract idea” relates to abstraction or generality in the claim language 
itself). 
 287 § 112 provides: “The specification shall contain a written description of 
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same ….” 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2010). 
 288 E.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Invitrogen Corp. 
v. Clontech Labs, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Martek Biosciences 
Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 289 E.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc. 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987); Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 290 For thoughtful analyses of the doctrine, see Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent 
Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 535-38 (2010) (discussing contradictions that 
arise from current enablement doctrine); Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of 
Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1353, 1368-72 (2010) (examin-
ing conflicting case law on contemporary enablement doctrine and doctrinal confu-
sion arising form choosing the level of abstraction to define patent protection); Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009) 
(characterizing contemporary enablement doctrine as “chaotic” and proposing differ-
ent rules); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of 
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141 (2008) (arguing that written description 
requirement compensates for indeterminacy of enablement standard). 
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the test of enablement, reasoning that as of the filing date it would 
have required undue experimentation to make the future embodi-
ments,291 but other decisions have upheld similar claims, reasoning 
that the original specification disclosed at least one mode of making 
and using the invention, even though it did not disclose the later tech-
nology.292 Some decisions insist that the disclosure must enable the 
“full scope” of the patent claims without undue experimentation,293 
yet others hold that “a broad claim may be enabled by disclosure of a 
single embodiment.”294 Determining the validity of prior claims that 
dominate later-developed technologies presents a difficult choice 
about how best to allocate incentives between earlier and later inven-
tors. With competing lines of authority available to justify different 
outcomes, enablement fails to provide useful guidance to courts or 
examiners in making that fundamental policy choice.   
In recent years the Federal Circuit has provided an additional con-
straint on claim scope in the form of a fortified requirement for a 
“written description” of the invention that is distinct from the re-
quirement of enablement.295 This somewhat controversial develop-
ment has been particularly important in limiting the scope of claims in 
biopharmaceutical patents,296 and has arguably eclipsed enablement 
doctrine as a limitation on claim scope.297    
  
 291 E.g., Plant Genetic Systems v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that patent claims to a plant cell transformed with a DNA 
fragment were not fully enabled where the specification taught how to transform dicot 
plants but not monocot plants, and existing technology as of filing date did not pro-
vide such a method for monocots). 
 292 See., e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 314 F.3d 1313, 1334-
37 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that patent claim to vertebrate cells with DNA control 
sequences for producing erythropoietin was adequately enabled by disclosure of 
examples using transformed Chinese hamster ovary and monkey cells yet also cov-
ered later technology using endogenous activation of erythropoietin in human cells). 
 293 Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art 
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experi-
mentation.’”) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 294 Spectra-Physics v. Coherent, 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  
 295 See Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Re-
gents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 296 See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Descrip-
tion Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 
(1998); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology:  Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834-35 (1999); Margaret Sampson, The 
Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1262 (2000). 
 297 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). In this case, the district court held claims to be invalid for lack of both enable-
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Patentable subject matter provides another backstop to the inde-
terminate doctrine of enablement for limiting the scope of claims aris-
ing out of discoveries of fundamental principles or natural phenom-
ena. Such claims raise special concerns for the patent system for two 
reasons. First, fundamental principles and natural phenomena are 
likely to be especially important to the work of future innovators, and 
promoting future innovation is a primary goal of patent law.  Second, 
newly discovered fundamental principles and natural phenomena may 
face few constraints from prior art, which is ordinarily an important 
determinant of allowable claim scope.298   
Understood as a limitation on claim scope rather than as an exclu-
sion of entire fields from patent protection, this exclusion provides a 
principle for limiting the scope of claims that might otherwise be quite 
broad and impose social costs that are quite high. Like the doctrine of 
enablement, this exclusion balances the interests of prior innovators 
against those of subsequent innovators. But while enablement directs 
attention towards determining the range of embodiments that the pat-
ent disclosure puts within easy reach of those skilled in the art, the 
patentable subject matter exclusion directs attention towards deter-
mining which aspects of the discovery must remain in the public do-
main to encourage future innovation. Both determinations present 
difficult line-drawing problems and would benefit from clearer policy 
guidance. 
 
3. Basic tools of scientific and technological work 
 
A recurring mantra in many judicial opinions about patentable 
subject matter is that excluded subject matter constitutes “basic tools” 
of scientific or technological work.299 The Supreme Court even recited 
this mantra in Bilski v. Kappos, declaring that business methods are 
“the basic tools of commercial work” and, “in many cases, the basic 
tools of further business innovation.”300 But taken this far, the “basic 
tools” concept would seem to cover every step in the course of incre-
mental innovation in any field, and thus fails to explain distinctions 
between patentable and excluded subject matter. 
  
ment and written description. The Federal Circuit affirmed on written description 
alone, without reaching enablement. 
 298 See Chiang, supra note 290, at 535. 
 299 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; 
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d at 1353-54; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
at 952; In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 979; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 at *104. 
 300 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3255. 
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Perhaps the relationship between homocysteine levels and vitamin 
deficiency in Laboratory Corporation of American Holdings v. Me-
tabolite Laboratories makes a better poster child for the “basic tools” 
argument than the risk-hedging method in Bilski v. Kappos.  Justice 
Breyer explains in his Laboratory Corporation dissent that the exclu-
sion of “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from 
patentable subject matter preserves free access to “fundamental build-
ing blocks” that are likely to be of value in many future research 
paths, thus preventing patents from obstructing future research.301 
While conceding that “the category of non-patentable ‘phenomena of 
nature,’ like the categories of ‘mental processes,’ and ‘abstract intel-
lectual concepts,’ is not easy to define,” Justice Breyer concluded 
“[t]here can be little doubt that the correlation between homocysteine 
and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a ‘natural phenome-
non.’”302 
The line-drawing problems may be more difficult than Justice 
Breyer recognizes.  Professor Allen Yu argues that the traditional ex-
clusions from patentable subject matter for natural phenomena and 
products may no longer correspond as closely to the “basic tools of 
scientific and technological work” as they did in the past, given that 
“[m]uch of biomedical know-how today is based on discoveries about 
basic workings of the human body.303  He explains that “[a]lmost all 
medical interventions involve restoring or mimicking nature, not re-
placing or improving nature.”304 In this environment, robust subject 
matter exclusions based on a distinction between what is “natural” and 
what is “man-made” seem to rest on “ungrounded legalistic and se-
mantics-based arguments” rather than on sound policy considera-
tions.305  Professor Yu proposes as one of several alternatives that the 
Court replace its relatively weak prohibition against the patenting of 
nature and abstract ideas with “a stronger, more explicit prohibition 
against the patenting of ‘basic tools of scientific and technological 
work,’” assessed from the perspective of a “person having ordinary 
skill in the art” or “PHOSITA.”306 Professor Yu predicts that a 
PHOSITA would not consider a test for homocysteine to detect vita-
min deficiency to be a basic tool of scientific and technological work, 
but would consider genes to be unpatentable under this standard.307 
  
 301 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 126-28. 
 302 Id. at 135. 
 303 Yu, supra note 33, at 395. 
 304 Id. at 400-01. 
 305 Id. at 401. 
 306 Id. at 428-29. 
 307 Id. at 429-30. 
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While recognizing that this standard is no easier to apply than the dis-
tinction between what is natural and what is man-made, Professor Yu 
nonetheless argues that his standard is superior because it “focuses on 
articulating the costs of patents.”308  Less salient in this approach are 
the benefits of patents, such as the social value of the incentives they 
provide for commercial product development, which ought to be 
weighed against these costs to achieve an efficient balance. Many 
inventions are simultaneously both basic tools of scientific and tech-
nological work and commercial technologies that may be put to im-
mediate practical use in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. With-
holding patents to keep basic tools in the public domain may thus si-
multaneously withhold incentives for new medical interventions, pos-
ing a stark conflict between avoiding the costs and securing the bene-
fits of patents. 
If the goal of withholding patents on basic tools of scientific and 
technological work is to provide a clear field for future researchers to 
make unfettered use of these tools, perhaps an exclusion from paten-
table subject matter is not the best doctrinal approach. An alternative 
that might be less destructive of incentives to develop new medical 
interventions would be to give researchers an infringement exemption, 
while leaving patent holders with patents that they could assert against 
providers of new medical interventions. Regrettably, U.S. law has 
done almost exactly the opposite: the Federal Circuit has restricted the 
scope of the common law research exemption from infringement li-
ability,309 while Congress has provided a statutory exemption from 
patent infringement remedies for medical practitioners and related 
health care entities.310   
A policy of promoting unfettered access to the basic tools of sci-
entific and technological work does not provide a fully coherent ac-
count of patentable subject matter doctrine, and it is not clear that 
exclusions from patentable subject matter are the best way to advance 
  
 308 Id. at 430. 
 309 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (unau-
thorized use of a patented invention in noncommercial academic research furthers the 
university’s “legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening 
students and faculty participating in these projects” and therefore “does not qualify 
for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense”).  A separate statu-
tory defense originally designed for generic drug manufacturers exempts the use of an 
invention “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2010).  This shelters 
some uses of patented inventions in biopharmaceutical research that is directed to-
wards new drug development.  See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 193 (2005).  
 310 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2010).   
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that policy. But it is as coherent a story as the courts have offered on 
the topic of patentable subject matter. The repeated references to “ba-
sic tools of scientific and technological work” in judicial opinions 
about patentable subject matter suggest a policy interest that might 
explain past decisions and guide future decisions about the scope of 
those exclusions. But there is little evidence in the opinions that the 
courts take this interest seriously. Instead the words appear inside 
quotation marks in paragraphs full of string citations, as part of a for-
mal homage to prior decisions rather than as an analytical tool for 
resolving current controversies at the frontiers of patentable subject 
matter. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court has created a state of high uncertainty as to 
the rules of patentable subject matter. By directing the lower courts to 
seek guidance from its own prior decisions without actually explain-
ing the policies served by patentable subject matter doctrine, it de-
mands formal adherence to the principle of stare decisis without fol-
lowing the discipline of common law reasoning. Many cases speak of 
patentable subject matter as a threshold test at the front door of the 
patent system, but current doctrine lacks the necessary clarity to func-
tion as an initial screen prior to full examination. Although field ex-
clusions from patentable subject matter might in the past have limited 
the heterogeneity of inventions covered by patent law, field exclusions 
have largely been repudiated by the courts, leaving vaguely worded 
exclusions that are as challenging to interpret and apply as any other 
standards for patentability. Some cases, particularly those asserting 
the unpatentability of natural phenomena and fundamental principles, 
have called for treating discoveries about the natural world as if they 
were already in the public domain, an approach that is sometimes 
criticized for conflating subject matter limitations with doctrines con-
cerning prior art and disclosure.  But patentable subject matter limita-
tions are not redundant to these other doctrines.  Patentable subject 
matter offers an additional tool for limiting the scope of patents that 
might otherwise unduly impede future research.  Language in paten-
table subject matter opinions about “basic tools of scientific and tech-
nological research” hints at a policy justification for this approach that 
is not fully examined, although it is consistently quoted approvingly. 
Perhaps these cases have wisdom to offer that could guide courts to-
day in adapting patentable subject matter doctrine to inventions at the 
current forefronts of technology. But in the absence of a more careful 
judicial account of the role of patentable subject matter to guide mod-
ern courts in channeling the wisdom of their predecessors, continued 
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adherence to these prior decisions seems instead like a form of dead-
hand control.  By reasserting its precedents as binding authority with-
out explaining them, the Supreme Court compounded this problem in 
Bilski v. Kappos.  In future decisions, it might do better to begin by 
distinguishing the function of patentable subject matter limitations 
from the functions served by other requirements for patent protection. 
 
